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The target of this project is to resolve a scenario in and around the Philippine 
Islands, employing AUSCANNZUKUS Coalition forces, and to study the Coalition 
impact of participating in the USN FORCEnet (Fn) program.  The goal of this study is to 
provide options and perspective to each nation in terms of identifying opportunities to 
participate in FORCEnet and the operational benefits that might result.  The second goal 
is to assist each nation’s decision-making process by demonstrating improved Coalition 
effectiveness with the implementation of FORCEnet. 
The framework for this study is derived from the Operation Philippine Comfort – 
CJTF scenario.  The scenario is based around a natural humanitarian disaster (volcanic 
eruption) creating international sentiment which requires relief action on the part of each 
nation.  Each AUSCANNZUKUS nation has naval and/or military assets with some dual 
use capability (naval/humanitarian relief) as well as inherent warfighting capability in the 
vicinity of the disaster.  Due to a change in government, the Philippines are experiencing 
political unrest due in part to Muslim factions in the southern province of Mindanao, 
whose intent is to use the chaos as an opportunity to achieve their goal of a separate 
secular state.  The mission of the CJTF evolves from humanitarian relief to one that also 
includes peace-keeping and law enforcement.  The U.S. dispatches an Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG) with an amphibious component to ensure that disaster relief is not 
impeded by the previously covert, but now openly aggressive support of the separatists 
by a Southeast Asian country with their naval units (SAG and SSK), as they attempt to 
oppose ESG access to the Sulu Sea . 
Lack of a single, multinational information sharing environment exists among the 
AUSCANNZUKUS Coalition.  Additionally, insufficient standardization and 
interoperability of C4ISR systems exists between U.S. and Coalition forces. To overcome 
these shortcomings, a fully functional agreement on standards creating a common 
CONcept of OPerations (CONOPS) and agreement in Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) is required by all participating countries. 
 xx
A key component to enhancing Joint Coalition Force operations is the 
strengthening of the collaboration between multinational partners, with the ultimate goal 
to improve the ability to collect, process, and share information. Operational experience 
has demonstrated shortcomings in Department of Defense (DoD) arrangements for 
multinational information sharing with Coalition partners. 
This project proposes a candidate operational and systems architectures and 
modeled them in an effort to demonstrate the following: 
• Enhanced collaboration capability between U.S. and Coalition partners 
• Improved ability to collect process and share information between U.S. and 
Coalition countries 
• Fully integrated Coalition operations and synchronization 
Platforms that are Partially Net Enabled or Fully Net Enabled show a higher rate 
of survivability. Secondary goals of the study were to model and identify if Coalition 
FORCEnet architecture improves: 
• Communication to all nodes 
• Accuracy and timeliness of information on friendly, environmental, neutral 
and hostile units 
• Storage and retrieval of authoritative data sources 
• Knowledge management capability with direct access ability to raw data 
• User-defined and shareable Situational Awareness (SA) 
• Distributed and collaborative command and control 
• Automated decision aids to enhance decision making 
• Information assurance 
• Cross-domain access and data exchange 
• Interoperability across all domains and agencies 
• Autonomous and disconnected operations 
• Automatic and adaptive diagnostic and repair 
The modeling results demonstrate that these attributes in a Coalition architecture 
made a considerable difference. 
The preliminary results show: 
 xxi
• Network-Centric warfighting is value added to Coalition Forces 
• Sensors - 5% improvement in number of threats detected 
•  C2 - 42% improvement in tracking via precision cue 
•  Engagement - 25% improvement in threat neutralization 
•  Non-FORCEnet forces sustain higher casualties 
The modeling assumes implementation of common Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and agreement in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).  Essential 
among these are: 
• Releasability Policy 
• Unity of Command and Control (C2) 
• Adequate Peace-Time Training 
Enabled Network-Centric Warfare for Coalition Forces shows a significant return 
on investment.  FORCEnet lends itself to accommodating Coalition enhancements 
providing a scalable and composable force structure.  Implementation of Level-3 and 4 




I. CAPABILITY DISCUSSION 
In an effort to identify capabilities required to improve United States and 
Coalition warfighting effectiveness in a network-centric environment, this project will: 
• Examine the tenets and capabilities provided by FORCEnet as described in 
existing literature and policy documents 
• Examine Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I) capabilities and their desired attributes to understand how they contribute to 
improved Situational Awareness (SA) and warfighting effectiveness 
• Examine both materiel and non-materiel solutions to develop recommendations 
for continued analysis, and 
• Conduct a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) analysis to quantify the potential 
warfighting improvement associated with the implementation of recommended 
capabilities 
A. INTRODUCTION – NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE AND FORCENET 
The concept of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) emerged in the late 1990s and is 
a key element of the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) effort to transform itself to meet 
the 21st Century military challenges1. NCW focuses on using advanced information 
technology (IT) – computers, high-speed data links, and networking software – to link 
U.S. Navy ships, aircraft, and shore installations into a highly integrated combat force 
through the implementation of local and wide-area networks. As has been seen, 
networking has affected society in many significant ways.  The World Wide Web and 
Internet have profoundly affected the global economy, as well as our personal lives. An 
extension of this technology to the realm of military operations is therefore an 
undertaking well worth consideration.  The DoN believes that NCW will dramatically 
improve naval combat capability and efficiency2. 
                                                 
1 For more on naval transformation, see CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation: Background 
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p. 
2 For discussions of NCW, see Alberts, David S. et al. Network-Centric Warfare, Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority. Washington, Department of Defense, 1999. 256 p; 
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FORCEnet is the process of making Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and Net-
Centric Operations a reality. 
¾ FORCEnet is: 
• The operational construct and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the 
Information Age which integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, 
scalable across a spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land3. 
• The naval Command and Control (C2) component for Sea Power 21 and 
Expeditionary Warfare. 
• The future implementation of Network-Centric Warfare in the naval services. 
• An enterprise alignment and integration initiative to serve as a change agent and 
engine for innovation, potentially touching every naval program. 
¾ What is the value-added of the FORCEnet Functional Concept (FnFC)?4 
• It provides critical shared direction, guiding principles, and projected evolutionary 
objectives for the Navy and Marine Corps development of future C2 capabilities, 
to ensure Naval Forces will be ready in the future security environment. 
• The FnFC serves as a vital and necessary bridge between the FORCEnet vision 
and the capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps must develop to ensure 
national security goals are met.  
• Additionally, the FnFC provides:  
1. Coherence and alignment of FORCEnet development efforts  
2. Acceleration in Fleet implementation of C2 capabilities  
3. Transformation of Navy operations in a warfighting or business role  
4. Front and center position for the warfighter in FORCEnet development  
                                                 
Cipriano, Joseph R. a Fundamental Shift in the Business of Warfighting. Sea Power, March 1999; 39-
42;  
Cebrowski, Arthur K, and John J Garstka Netwrk-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future. U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, January 1998; 28-35. 
3 CNO’s strategic Study group – XXI definition from 22 July 02 CNO Briefing. Network-Centric 
Warfare, 2nd Edition, by D.S. Alberts, J.J. Garstka, and F.P. Stein 
4 FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century, February 2005 
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• The 15 specific capabilities that the FnFC has identified have been articulated to 
support the development of architectures and future experimentation, and to drive 
Navy and Marine Corps programmatic requirements.  
1. Provide robust, reliable communication to all nodes, based on the varying 
information requirements and capabilities of those nodes.  
2. Provide reliable, accurate and timely location, identity and status information 
on all friendly forces, units, activities and entities or individuals.  
3. Provide reliable, accurate and timely location, identification, tracking and 
engagement information on environmental, neutral and hostile elements, 
activities, events, sites, platforms, and individuals.  
4. Store, catalogue and retrieve all information produced by any node on the 
network in a comprehensive, standard repository so that the information is 
readily accessible to all nodes and compatible with the forms required by any 
node, within security restrictions.  
5. Process, sort, analyze, evaluate, and synthesize large amounts of disparate 
information while still providing direct access to raw data as required.  
6. Provide each decision maker the ability to depict situational information in a 
tailorable, user-defined, shareable, primarily visual representation.  
7. Provide distributed groups of decision makers the ability to cooperate in the 
performance of common command and control activities by means of a 
collaborative work environment.  
8. Automate certain lower-order command and control sub-processes and to use 
intelligent agents and automated decision aids to assist people in performing 
higher-order sub-processes, such as gaining situational awareness and 
devising concepts of operations.  
9. Provide information assurance.  
10. Function in multiple security domains and multiple security levels within a 
domain and manage access dynamically.  
11. Interoperate with command and control systems of very different type and 
level of sophistication.  
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12. Allow individual nodes to function while temporarily disconnected from the 
network. 
13. Automatically and adaptively monitor and manage the functioning of the 
command and control system to ensure effective and efficient operation and to 
diagnose problems and make repairs as needed.  
14. Incorporate new capabilities into the system quickly without causing undue 
disruption to the performance of the system.  
15. Provide decision makers the ability to make and implement good decisions 
quickly under conditions of uncertainty, friction, time, pressure, and other 
stresses.   
• The FnFC also identifies six dimensions of development effort:  
1. Physical – platforms, weapons, sensors, etc. 
2. Information Technology – communications and network infrastructure  
3. Data – structure and protocols for information handling  
4. Cognitive – interfaces that support judgment and decision making 
5. Organizational – new structures and working relationships that will be made 
possible by FORCEnet  
6. Operating – new methods and concepts by which forces will accomplish 
missions with the new, FORCEnet-provided capabilities  
The concept of FORCEnet operations will generate increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, 
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.  
B. CAPABILITY GAPS 
Recent operational experience with allied nations demonstrated shortcomings in 
the Department of Defense (DoD) arrangements for multinational information sharing 
with Coalition partners5 including the efforts during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
where the operational area force was comprised of thirty-one (31) U.S. Navy ships and 
                                                 
5 DoD Instruction 8110.1 Subject: Multinational Information Sharing Transformation Change Package 
of 6 February 2004. 
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sixty (60) Coalition platforms from eleven (11) countries6.  Some of these shortcomings 
are based on the fact that the communication systems used by each nation are not 
interoperable with one another.  Therefore they cannot share battlefield information as it 
is acquired.  There is a lack of a single multinational information sharing environment 
and there is insufficient standardization in systems to enable interoperability between 
U.S. and Coalition forces. 
To overcome this interoperability gap the United States Navy is developing and 
implementing FORCEnet, not only to enable communication with multiple U.S. 
platforms, but also to utilize the information gathered from all the platforms, creating a 
Common Operating Picture (COP).  Distribution of the COP would allow all platforms in 
the theater to have the same comprehension and understanding of what actions and plans 
are in effect for an area. 
The implementation of the FORCEnet architecture can, and should, be extended 
beyond United States forces, to include any allied or participating nations, but in 
particular, the Coalition forces of AUSCANNZUK.  It must be remembered that 
FORCEnet is not a system or a collection of systems, but an architecture under which the 
systems from the Coalition forces must become interoperable in order to take advantage 
of the capabilities FORCEnet provides. 
C. REQUIREMENT FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Reiterating, FORCEnet is defined as the operational construct and architectural 
framework for naval warfare in the Information Age, integrating warriors, sensors, 
command and control, platforms and weapons in a networked, distributed combat force7.  
This integration requires that systems be networked such that data can be shared between 
platforms and countries.  Additionally, the information obtained would be capable of 
being synchronized and delivered in a timely manner so that it can be fully taken 
advantage of in order to be able to supply COP to the Coalition force.  This concept of 
shared information is the foundation of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW).  The term 
Network-Centric Warfare broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging 
                                                 
6 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) Brief, 9 January 2006 
7 FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century, February 2005  
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tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially 
networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage8. 
This "networking" utilizes information technology via a robust network to allow 
increased information sharing, collaboration, and shared situational awareness, which 
theoretically allows greater self-synchronization, speed of command, and mission 
effectiveness. 
 The theory has four basic tenets: 
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing 
2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness 
3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command 
4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness9 
D. EVALUATION OF FORCENET FOR COALITION FORCES 
Network-Centric Warfare brings together a powerful set of warfighting concepts 
and associated military capabilities that enable the warfighters to exploit information in 
order to bring assets to bear in a rapid and flexible manner.  This is the basis behind the 
possible benefits to the AUSCANNZUKUS Coalition force.  This paper reviews those 
benefits and models them based on the sample scenario.   
                                                 
8 John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare Offers Warfighting Advantage,” Signal, May 2003, p. 
58. 
9 Wikipedia,, on-line, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki, accessed August 2006 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FORCENET C4ISR 
One of the main goals for future joint operations with U.S. and Coalition forces is 
to increase data sharing through networking technologies. Through the use of networking 
technologies, a group of individual platforms can function as one large, netted battle 
force.  With a netted battle force, all platforms have the same tactical picture and 
platform resources such as sensors and weapons are available for use by the entire battle 
force.  Conducting military operations more efficiently and effectively by using these 
integrated and distributed resources is the ultimate goal of the network-centric warfare 
concept.   
The purpose of Section 2 is to describe the enabling technologies that make it 
possible to conduct network-centric warfare.  The topics in this section include Integrated 
Fire Control, the Joint Track Manager, future Tactical Data Links (TDL), the Global 
Information Grid (GIG), and underwater networking technologies.  A description of the 
C4ISR technical challenges, limitations and gaps is also provided in the concluding 
sections. 
As previously stated, one major goal of the network-centric battle force is to 
increase data sharing.  One of the early systems that made it possible to conduct network-
centric operations was the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system.  CEC 
combines a high-performance sensor grid with a high-performance engagement grid.  The 
sensor grid rapidly generates engagement quality measurement data which allows the 
engagement grid to neutralize targets over a larger area than was previously possible.  
The CEC sensor grid fuses data from multiple sensors to develop engagement quality 
composite tracks, creating a higher quality fire control picture than was previously 
possible using with stand-alone sensors.  The ability to cooperatively engage targets 
increased both the lethality and survivability of the battle force.   
One capability that is possible through network-centric warfare is Integrated Fire 
Control (IFC).   IFC could only be realized through a netted battle force. A netted battle 
force will be able to effective track and efficiently used its weapons resources.  The 
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concept of integrated fire control is to use the sensors and weapons of multiple platforms 
to engage targets more effectively than was possible using the sensors and weapons of a 
single platform.  IFC is described in Section 2.2.2. 
The goal of the Global Information Grid (GIG) is to provide the means for data 
sharing between geographically separated nodes such as the battle force, command 
centers, intelligence organizations, etc. The GIG should greatly increase data sharing 
among all participants. The GIG is faced with many challenges, i.e. quality of services, 
bandwidth, and timeliness, to name a few. Section 2.2.3 explains the purpose of the GIG 
and its core services. 
As the battle force makes the transition to a network-centric capability, tactical 
data links will continue to support the exchange of command and control information 
between legacy units.  Information exchange between TDLs and network-centric units 
will be possible using gateway units.  The TDLs will also server as a backup to the netted 
battle force as well as another source of information.  Section 2.2.4 describes the role of 
tactical data links in the network-centric warfare concept. 
The Joint Track Manager (JTM) performs several functions.  The JTM is 
responsible for processing tactical information and producing a common tactical picture.  
The JTM also manages and allocates the battle force resources (sensor, weapons, and C2 
systems) based on threat assessment results.  A behavior model concept is designed into 
all JTM units, which if given identical data to process produces identical results at each 
unit. Section 2.2.5 describes components and functions of the JTM including data fusion, 
the integrated behavior model, the resource manager, and data mining.    
Section 2.2.6 looks into underwater networking technology in a system called 
Seaweb. This system enables network-centric warfare in the subsurface environment. 
B. FORCENET ENABLING TECHNOLOGY 
1. Sensor Networking Technology 
a. Introduction 
The U.S. military operational architecture consists of three grids:  the 
Sensor grid, the Communications and Control (C2) grid, and the Shooter grid.  In a Naval 
platform-centric architecture, the sensor grid is generally utilized and managed to support 
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a single weapon or combat system.  Platform-centric sensor system consists of single 
intelligence stovepipes to support an individual platform’s needs.  Figure 2-110 depicted a 
sensor platform with a dedicated C2 node.  
 
• S in g le - IN T  S to v e p ip e s
• S e n s o r /C 2  S to v e p ip e s
(S e n s o r  P la t fo r m  w ith
d e d ic a te d  C 2  N o d e )
 
Figure 2-1 Platform-Centric Sensor Grid 
 
In the Naval platform-centric architecture, sensors and weapons have not 
been used to their full capability.  This is illustrated in Figure 2-2, Platform-Centric 
Engagement Envelope.  In this figure, the sensing envelope is represented by the green-
shaded circle.  The maximum weapons employment envelope is represented by a blue-
shaded circle.  In platform-centric operations, combat power is projected only when a 
platform’s onboard sensor provides engagement quality data to the weapons system and 
the target is within the weapon’s maximum employment envelope.  The effective 
engagement envelope is the area defined by the overlap of the area where engagement 
quality data is available and the maximum employment envelope of the weapon.  The 
effective engagement envelope (E3) is portrayed as the red-shaded area of the diagram. 
Consequently, the instantaneous combat power for a platform-centric engagement is 
proportional to the effective engagement envelope. As is apparent from the diagram, in 
platform-centric operations, combat power is often marginalized by the inability of the 
platform to generate engagement quality data at ranges greater than or equal to the 
maximum weapons employment envelope. This situation occurs frequently in platform-
                                                 
10 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 
Conference, October 30-31, 2000. 
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centric air engagements, as a result of the inability of an aircrew to positively identify as 
friend or foe the objects that they can detect and track at the full range of their sensors11. 
The right-hand-side of Figure 2-212 shows that the point in time when a 
weapon can actually be fired comes later in the sensor-to-shooter timeline than the time 























Flight of Enemy Missile
 
Figure 2-2 Platform-Centric Engagement Envelope 
 
The ultimate goal is to make the transformation from a number of 
platform-centric sensor systems to a network-centric sensor system.  This should provide 
benefits to the platforms in the battle force such as increased detection ranges, 
improvements in engagements with less resource depletion, and decreased sensor-to-
shooter timelines. Figure 2-313 depicts the increase in E3 with a network-centric sensor 
system. 
                                                 
11 Network-Centric Warfare by D.S. Alberts, J.J. Garstka, and F.P. Stein, 2nd edition, February 2000 
12 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 

















Network Centric BF Collaboration
 
Figure 2-3 The Ultimate Goal 
The ultimate grid would network the three grids from the sensor to the 
shooter grid and would remove the stovepipes in the platform-centric architecture as 
shown in Figure 2-414. 
                                                 







Figure 2-4 The Ultimate Grid 
b. Advantages of Network-Centric Sensor system 
The following are some examples of the benefits of network-centric sensor 
system.  First, network-centric sensor enables detection of low-signature targets such as 
submarines shown in Figure 2-515.  Low-signature targets are difficult to detect, classify, 
and engage.  By combining sensors and sources in numbers, types, and locations, low-
signature targets can then be detected and classified. 
                                                 
15 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 
Conference, October 30-31, 2000 
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Network Centric Sensor Enables
Detection of Low-Signature Targets
• Low signature targets are difficult to detect, classify, & engage.
   - Low radar cross sections. Low active sonar cross sections.
   - Low radiated noise. Low radiated IR/heat.
• Combine sensors and sources in numbers, types, and locations to sense and illuminate low
signature targets.
 
Figure 2-5 Low-Signature Targets Detection Example 
 
The second benefit is that network-centric sensors reduce the area of 
uncertainty in target tracking as shown in Figure 2-616.  As shown in this example, the 
area of uncertainty for Radar Y and B is shown in the yellow and blue areas around the 
target.  By combining sensors from different positions or with different frequency ranges, 
the area of uncertainty is reduced significantly as depicted in the green area around the 
target of Figure 2-6. 
                                                 
16 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 
Conference, October 30-31, 2000 
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N etw ork C entric  Sensor
R educes Error
• C om bine sensors from  d ifferen t positions or w ith  d ifferent frequency ranges to  im prove m easurem ent
accuracy.
• R equ ires p recise synchronization  and position  o f sensors.
 
Figure 2-6 Error Reduction Example 
Third, network-centric sensor systems improve targeting using sensor data 
fusion.  Certain classes of objects cannot be tracked, located, or identified with sufficient 
accuracy using a single type of sensor or sensing technique.  This deficiency can 
sometimes be overcome by linking sensors of different types to achieve a multiple source 
capability.  Figure 2-717 shows the significant reduction in position uncertainty that is 
possible with sensor data fusion. 
                                                 
17 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 





Figure 2-7 Targeting Improvement Example 
 
In addition, sensor data fusion also provides improvement in target 
tracking as portrayed in Figure 2-818.  As shown in this figure, individual stations or 
elements do not have a complete track picture due to interference such as fade zone, rain, 
multi-path, jamming, etc.  With sensor data fusion, a complete composite track of the 
target is possible.  
                                                 
18 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 





Figure 2-8 Tracking Improvement Example 
Fourth, network-centric sensors increase awareness of the battle field.  
Network-centric sensors enable commanders to rapidly generate battle space awareness 
and to synchronize operations with platforms in the battle force as depicted in Figure 
2-919. 
Netw ork Centric Sensor
Increases Aw areness
• Netw ork Centric Sensor enables
Com m anders to
- Rapid ly generate battlespace
Aw areness
- Synchronized w ith  operations
A  netw ork-centric force increases battlespace aw areness by
overcom ing the lim itations of p latform  sensors through
em ploym ent of netw ork centric sensor  
Figure 2-9 Battlespace Awareness Example 
                                                 
19 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 
Conference, October 30-31, 2000 
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In summary, network-centric sensors can decrease time to engagement as 
shown in the time domain plot of Figure 2-1020.  In addition, network-centric sensors can 
improve tracking accuracy and continuity, target detection and identification, and 
extended detection ranges.  The robust networking of sensors provides the force with the 
capability to generate shared awareness with increased quality. 
Summary: Improved
Engagement
• Decreased time to engagement
• Improved track accuracy & continuity
• Improved target detection & identification
• Extended detection ranges
 
Figure 2-10 Network-Centric Sensor Improvement 
c. Enablers for Network-Centric Sensor Concept 
The networking of sensor systems from different platforms creates an 
information architecture in which sensor management can shift to a battle force focus.  In 
such a network-centric paradigm, individual sensors address the need of the battle force 
as a whole.  In order for this to work, there is a need for an automated sensor resource 
manager that tasks sensors to address battle force needs.  Network-centric resource 
management relies on the achievement of battle force information superiority.  
Information concerning the tactical battle space and battle force resources must be timely, 
accurate, and consistent across the battle force in order to enable optimized sensor 
command and control.   
                                                 
20 Sensor Network for Network-Centric Warfare by John Walrod, Network-centric Warfare 
Conference, October 30-31, 2000 
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Enabling a network-centric sensor resource manager requires:  an 
information database, automated link management, and human-machine interaction21. 
(1) Information Database 
An information database is the first enabler for a network-centric sensor resource 
management concept.   This information database in turn enables the creation of shared 
battle space awareness and knowledge.  There are three realms of battle force 
information:  the Common Operational Picture (COP), the Common Tactical Picture 
(CTP), and the Fire control Picture (FCP).    Figure 2-1122 depicts the three realms of 
information. 
 
Figure 2-11 Three Realms of Battle Force Information 
 
The COP consists of non-real-time tactical information used for mission planning 
and force management, such as blue and red Course of Actions (COAs), a priori 
knowledge of the enemy, and cultural, political, and geographical features.  The CTP 
consists of near-real-time tactical data and information used for cueing and managing 
battle force resources (such as sensors, communications, and weapons).  The FCP is the 
                                                 
21 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
22 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
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collection of real-time fire control quality data/measurements used to support weapons 
during launch and in-flight.  Information from all these three categories is relevant to the 
effective and efficient management of battle force resources as well as addressing battle 
force threats and operations23. 
(2) Automated Link Management 
A second enabler for network-centric sensor management is the automated link 
management for distribution of data throughout the battle force.  This automated link 
management allows for inter-platform data communications and exchange.  Due to the 
bandwidth constraints of the communications devices, the battle force must intelligently 
distribute data and information between decision nodes based on the needs of the battle 
force information users, which dynamically change as the operations and missions 
changes.  For example, during remote engagements, the sensor resource manager will 
require interplatform throughput priority for the FCP data to support the closing of the 
fire control loop24. 
The automated link management concept is shown in Figure 2-1225.  As shown in 
this figure, the Link Interface module handles the necessary protocol for establishing 
communications with other platforms.  In addition, the Link Interface module must also 
interface with the information database to send and retrieve data from this database to 
allow synchronization between the platforms in the battle force.  Another element of the 
automated link management is the Link Manager.  The Link Manager module handles the 
following tasks: 
1. Determines the needs of the information-recipient users or decision nodes. 
2. Keeps track of what data and information is available. 
                                                 
23 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
24 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
25 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
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3. Determines the feasibility of transmission (whether the decision nodes are within 
transmission distance, whether the communication links can support transmission, 
whether the transmission will support the user’s timeline, etc.). 
4. Sends commands to other link managers within the BF to control and manage 
transmissions and transmission modes. 
5. Transmits data and information as required. 
 
 
Figure 2-12 Automated Link Management Concept 
(3) Human-Machine Interaction 
In any system, a human has to be involved in the final decision making.  In the 
sensor system, a human (the operator) forms an integral link in providing feedback 
between tracking performance and future sensor behavior.  With the increasing 
complexity of information in the network-centric sensor system, the sensor resource 
management system must process all the information and provide only concise 
information that allows the operator to make a quick decision and to perform manual 
override if necessary.  This is called the Automatic Sensor System, which provides the 
following benefits26: 
1. Reduced Operator Workload:  Automatic Sensor System alleviates the need for 
the operator to specify each sensor operation or future behavior.  The automated 
sensor manager is responsible for controlling future sensor behavior while the 
                                                 
26 Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management by B.W. Johnson and J.M. Green, April 
2002 
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operator exercises control by negation. Hence, the operator’s role can simply just 
provide the following actions: override a track’s priority, establish degree of 
allowable active radiation, request special data collection, etc. 
2. Sensor Tasking based on finer detail:  An operator’s control ability is based on 
information shown on a display and the ability to assimilate information into the 
human decision- making process.  This limits the amount, types, and degree of 
detail of information feeding the sensor control decisions.  On the other hand, 
automating sensor tasking allows more amounts, types, and finer degrees of 
detailed information to support the decision-making process. 
3. Faster Adaptation: Automatic sensor system allows much faster adaptation to 
the changing environment, i.e., earlier detection of tracking performance 
degradation.    
2. Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
a. Introduction  
Integrated Fire Control (IFC) refers to the participation and coordination 
of multiple non-collocated warfare assets in tactical engagements of enemy targets.  IFC 
is defined as the ability of a weapon system to develop fire control solutions from 
information provided by one or more non-organic sensor sources; conduct engagements 
based on these fire control solutions; and either provide mid-course guidance (in-flight 
target updates) to the interceptors based on this externally provided information or in 
specific cases, have them provided by a warfare unit other then the launching unit.27  
Table 2-1 highlights the benefits of Integrated Fire Control:28   
Table 2-1 IFC Benefits 
• Selection of the best shooter from a set of geographically 
distributed weapons 
• Improved chance of interception by selecting the optimal 
engagement geometry 
                                                 
27 Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) Operational Concept document (July 2002) 
28 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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• Improved economy of weapon resources by reducing 
redundant shots 
• Earlier launch decisions are possible through remote detection 
and precision tracking 
• Decoupling of local sensor/weapon pairing constraint 
• Sharing engagement control – forward pass 
• Off-board engagement support for guidance relay and target 
illumination  
• Enhanced defense against complex threat environments 
(sophisticated or significant numbers of aerospace targets) – 
IFC may be a necessity 
 
b. IFC Capabilities 
There are a variety of techniques for collaboration between warfare 
elements in order to execute integrated engagements.  Collaboration can be as simple as 
receiving an early warning cue from a satellite source to the complex collaboration 
required to pass engagement quality data and control to a remote source.  The following 
paragraphs outline IFC capabilities from an operational construct:    
• Precision Cue is an IFC capability where a threat cue from a remote source 
(sensor, Intel, TADIL, etc.) is received and acted upon by the local combat 
system.  The cue is used to provide the local sensor with acquisition information 
in order to narrow the search and is typically comprised of general location, track 
data and/or identification assessment.  Figure 2-1329 below illustrates the 
precision cue concept. 
                                                 
29 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-13 Precision Cue 
• Launch on Remote (LoR) is an IFC capability that uses a remote sensor to initiate 
a local missile launch even though the local unit does not hold a local sensor 
track.  LoR is predicated on the local sensor providing in-flight guidance after 
missile launch.  Launch on Composite (LoC) is a close variant where composite 
data developed from multiple remote sensors is used to initiate the missile launch.  
Figure 2-1430 below depicts a LoR scenario where the initial launch is based on 
remote sensor data with in-flight guidance provided by the shooter.   
                                                 
30 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-14 Launch on Remote 
• Engage on Remote (EoR) is an IFC capability where the remote sensor plays the 
primary role in providing pre and post launch Fire Control quality sensor data up 
to and including terminal illumination.  Engage on Composite (EoC) is a like 
variant where composite Fire Control Quality data from multiple remote sensors 
is used to support missile launch and engagement.  Figure 2-1531 below is 
illustrative of an EoR engagement scenario.   
                                                 
31 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-15 Engagement on Remote 
• Forward Pass is an IFC capability where in-flight missile control can be 
transitioned or forward passed to another unit to complete the engagement.  
Forward Pass is a redundancy technique that allows an engagement to be 
completed when the originating unit becomes constrained by system limitations or 
the environment.  Forward Pass may also be a tactical technique to exploit an 
adversary’s defense or to gain more refined terminal guidance from a better 
positioned unit.  Figure 2-1632 below is representative of a Forward Pass scenario 
where the remote unit assumes control of the in-flight missile.  
                                                 
32 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-16 Forward Pass 
• Remote Fire is an IFC capability where the launch decision is made by the remote 
unit.  After launch, in-flight guidance can be either retained by the remote unit or 
passed to the local unit.  Figure 2-1733 below is representative of a Remote Fire 
scenario where the remote unit initiates the launch and retains control of the target 
engagement.   
                                                 
33 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-17 Remote Fire 
• Preferred Shooter Determination is an IFC capability where the optimum weapon 
is collaboratively selected from a group of warfare units for target engagement.  
Optimal geometry and engagement characteristics are used to determine the 
preferred unit.  This capability can be used in parallel with the other IFC 
capabilities and truly encapsulates, Force-centric weapon-target pairing34.  Figure 
2-1835 below depicts a Preferred Shooter Determination scenario comprised of 
five platforms sharing data in a collaborative environment in order to select the 
optimal platform for threat engagement.         
                                                 
34 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
35 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-18 Preferred Shooter Determination 
c. IFC Process  
Figure 2-1936 below outlines the conceptual IFC flow built on Integrated 
Architecture Behavior Models (IABMs) that function collaboratively as a distributed 
system using common processing to facilitate shared situation awareness.  The 
highlighted data fusion blocks (level 1- 4) will be discussed in greater detail later in the 
Data Fusion section.  Table 2-237 lists decision products provided by IFC, Automated 
Management Aids (AMA) and Data Fusion working in a collaborative environment.   
 
                                                 
36 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
37 Young, B. W. (2004).  Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare 
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Figure 2-19 Functional IFC 
Table 2-2 List of IFC Products 
• Preferred shooter determination 
• Weapon to Target Pairing 
• Sensor support for engagements 
• Engagement control strategy (Forward Pass) 
• Engagement preferences 
 
3. Global Information Grid (GIG) 
a. Introduction 
The Global Information Grid (GIG) provides the ability to organize, 
transform, and manage information technology (IT) throughout the DoD.  GIG policy, 
governance procedures, and supporting architectures are the basis for developing and 
evolving IT capabilities, IT capital planning and funding strategies, and management of 
legacy (existing) IT services and systems in the DoD.  In discussing the GIG and how a 
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particular program interacts with, supports, or relies upon the GIG, it is useful to think of 
the GIG from three perspectives – its vision, its implementation, and its architecture. 
b. Overview 
In the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 8100.1, the GIG and its 
assets are defined as: 
The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel.  The GIG includes all owned and 
leased communications and computing systems and services, software 
(including applications), data, security services, and other associated 
services necessary to achieve information superiority.  It also includes 
national security systems as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen 
Act of 1996. The GIG supports all DoD, national security, and related 
intelligence community missions and functions (strategic, operational, 
tactical, and business), in war and in peace.  The GIG provides capabilities 
from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, 
mobile platforms, and deployed sites).  The GIG provides interfaces to 
Coalition, allied, and non-DoD users and systems38. 
c. Vision 
The vision of the GIG is to enable users, in any conditions and with 
attendant security, to have easy access to information at anytime and anyplace.  Program 
managers, sponsors and Domain Owners can use this vision to help guide their 
acquisition programs.  This vision requires a comprehensive information capability that is 
global, robust, survivable, maintainable, interoperable, secure, reliable, and user-driven.  
The goal is to increase the net-centricity of warfighter, business, intelligence, DoD 
enterprise management, and enterprise information environment management operations.  
Making these operations more network-centric will increase information access by GIG 
users, provide the information and expertise to support operational decisions, allow more 




                                                 
38 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 8100.1 
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d. Mission 
The mission for the GIG is to provide assured net-centric end-to-end 
services seamlessly in support of the DoD’s full spectrum of warfighting, intelligence, 
and business missions.  The objective of net-centric services is to ensure that information 
flow can be optimized and quickly accessed by decision makers.   Rapid access to timely 
information will help theater decision makers to more effectively carry out their mission.   
The effectiveness of the GIG will be measured in terms of availability and reliability of 
net-centric services, across all domains, in compliance with specified service levels and 
polices.  The method for service assurance in a net-centric collaborative environment is to 
establish operational thresholds, compliance monitoring, and a clear understanding of the 
capabilities between enterprise service/resource providers and consumers through Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs). 
e. Description 
As stated in Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020), the demand for the GIG has been 
driven by the requirement for information and decision superiority to achieve full-
spectrum dominance.  JV 2020 also highlights the importance of a Net-Centric Warfare 
environment, which is enabled by the GIG to improve information sharing through the 
robust networking of warfighting forces.  The Joint Staff prepared a pamphlet called 
Enabling the Joint Vision that envisions the GIG as: 
• A single, secure grid providing seamless end-to-end capabilities to all 
warfighting, national security, and support users 
• Supporting DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) requirements from 
peace time business support through levels of conflict 
• Joint, high-capacity netted operations 
• Fused with weapons systems 
• Supporting strategic, operational, tactical, and base/pots/camp/station 
• Plug-and-play interoperability 
• Guaranteed for United States and Allied forces 
• Connectivity for Coalition users 
• Tactical and functional fusion a reality 
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• Information/bandwidth on demand 
• Defense in depth against all threats 
To ensure that systems that constitute and use the GIG interoperate in a net-
centric manner, the OASD(NII)/DoD CIO prepared the “Net-Centric Checklist” (12 May 
2004, Version 2.1.3), which requires programs to address the following issues: 
• Ensuring that data are visible, available, and usable when needed and 
where needed to accelerate decision making. 
• Tagging of all data (intelligence, non-intelligence, raw, and processed) 
with metadata to enable discovery of data by users. 
• Posting of all data to shared spaces to provide access to all users 
except when limited by security, policy, or regulations. 
• Advancing the Department from defining interoperability through 
point-to-point interfaces to enabling many-to-many exchanges typical 
of a network environment. 
The GIG Net-Centric Information Document (NCID) is a compilation of 
the enterprise-level functionality that must be achieved if GIG programs are to satisfy the 
policy and technical directives contained in these documents and the needs of the users as 
described in the GIG Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document (MA ICD). 
f. Global Information Grid (GIG) Enterprise Services (GIG ES) 
Capability Development Document 
The GIG ES Capability Development Document (CDD) focuses on nine 
enterprise services provided by the Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) Program.  
The Defense Information Systems Agency provides these enterprise services to establish 
the foundation for the initial net-centric capabilities.  The Global Information Grid Core 
Enterprise Services Strategy Document39 describes the overall set of services in detail.  
The NCES program will develop the core enterprise services 
incrementally.  Each program that is dependent upon the core services being developed 
by the NCES program should address the impact of the incremental NCES schedule on 
                                                 
39 Global Information Grid (GIG) Core Enterprise Services Strategy document can be found at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/org/cio/doc/GIG_ES_Core_Enterprise_Services_Strategy_V1-1a.pdf 
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their program.  The Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) 
provides a basis for discussing issues associated with these core services.  The table 
below (Table 2-3) shows the relationship of the nine Core Services articulated in the GIG 
ES Capability Development Document to the services articulated in the NCOW RM. 
Table 2-3 Mapping of GIG ES/NCES Core Services to Net-
Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model Services 
GIG ES Capability Development 
Document/NCES 
NCOW RM Activity 
Application A316 (Provide Applications Services) 
Collaboration A312 (Provide Collaboration Services) 
Discovery A311 (Perform Discovery Services) 
Enterprise Services 
Management/NetOps 
A33 (Environment Control Services) 
and A5 (Manage Net-Centric Environment) 
Information Assurance/ Security 
A33 (Environment Control Services) 
and A5 (Manage Net-Centric Environment) 
Mediation 
A314 (Perform Information Mediation 
Services) 
Messaging A313 (Provide Messaging Services) 
Storage 
A315 (Perform Information Storage 
Services) 
User Assistance A2 (Perform User Agent Services) 
 
g. Compliance with the Global Information Grid (GIG) 
Compliance with the GIG means that an information technology-based 
initiative or an acquisition program demonstrates compliance in the following areas: 
1. DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF)40 – Identifying and meeting the 
requirement in order to produce the architectural products.  A complete integrated 
architecture can be developed using the specified products described in the 
                                                 
40 DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) found at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/doc/DoDAF_v1_Volume_I.pdf 
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DoDAF document.   This document can assist in generating requirements such as 
capability definition, process re-engineering, investment decisions, and 
integration engineering.  
2. Core Architecture Data Model (CADM)41 – Using the CADM architecture 
data, this would enable developing integrated architecture.  
3. DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR)42 – Enabling GIG 
users to meet requirements in selecting technologies and standards.  This 
requirement is met by defining and implementing capabilities, based on 
technologies and standards contained within the JTA/DISR.  Meeting this 
requirement should be validated at every milestone. 
4. DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy43 - Providing the associated metadata, and 
defining and documenting the program’s data models can be met by:  
a. Describing the metadata that has been registered in the DoD Data 
Metadata Registry for each data asset used and for each data asset 
produced (i.e., data for which the program is the Source Data Authority).  
b. Providing the documented data models associated with the program.  
5. GIG Capstone Requirements Document44 (CRD) - Using this document to 
verify an overall degree of conformance and to identify and address issues and 
risks.  
6. Use of Standards – Enforcement of IT and architecture standards is an essential 
element for achieving interoperability across the GIG.   
a. Compliance. GIG systems should be implemented in accordance with the 
latest versions of the DoD JTA45 unless waived in accordance with the 
                                                 
41 Core Architecture Data Model (CADM), Baseline Version 1.1 is the current official version of the 
CADM as published by DoD. There have been several versions of this model since 1996 until it was placed 
under configuration control in 2003.  
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/ICCRTS_Denmark/CD/papers/116.pdf 
42 DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR) found at 
https://disronline.disa.mil/DISR/index.jsp 
43 DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy found at http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/org/cio/doc/Net-Centric-
Data-Strategy-2003-05-092.pdf 
44 GIG Capstone Requirements Document found at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA408877 
45 DoD JTA found at http://www.tricare.osd.mil/policy/tma00/techarch.htm 
 35
waiver process described in DoDI 5000.2-R46. Systems that are part of 
host nation and bilateral agreements should be checked for their ability to 
interface with the GIG. 
b. Interoperability Testing and Certification. Interoperability testing and 
certification should be addressed as an integral part of the requirements 
generation process prior to production, fielding, and life cycle support, as 
required, of GIG systems regardless of ACAT level, in accordance with 
CJCSI 6212.01B47. 
c. Technology Insertion.  The GIG should apply open-system design 
strategies to enable the insertion of new and emerging technologies while 
maintaining interoperability with existing GIG systems and architectures.  
However, emerging technologies, for which standards do not exist, may be 
incorporated with an appropriate waiver to the JTA, only if they can 
integrate in a seamless and efficient manner (i.e., without compromising 
interoperability or GIG functionality requirements).  Such JTA-waived 
technology insertions should be reviewed for feasibility of replacement 
with standards-based technology when appropriate. 
d. Data Standards.  All GIG systems should support standardized semantic 
tagging of data, unless it is not feasible to do so (such as may be the case 
with certain legacy systems).  Both the syntax and semantics of GIG data 
and semantic tagging mechanisms should comply with applicable DoD 
standards.  In cases where standards do not exist for a class of data, the 
developer should unambiguously define the syntax and semantics. 
4. Tactical Data Links 
A portion of the analysis performed for this project was to quantify the benefits of 
Coalition participation in FORCEnet.  The statement of work (SOW) and scenario 
description provided descriptions of the various Coalition FORCEnet participation levels  
 
 
                                                 
46 DODI 5000.2-R found at http://exploration.nasa.gov/documents/TTT_052005/DoD50002R.pdf 
47 CJCSI 6212.01B found at http://www.army.mil/howwewillfight/references/9%20CJCSI.pdf 
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to facilitate comparisons.  In one of the options, the battle force is evaluated when the 
Coalition Forces are at FORCEnet level zero.  Level zero is defined in the following 
manner: 
No FORCEnet.  Vessels use voice radio and Link 11 or 16 to share 
situational awareness and C2 data.  Platform-centric in character. 
While the SOW defines tactical data link operations as no FORCEnet, other 
documents, such as the the Naval Transformation Roadmap (NTR), describe a role for 
the tactical data links in FORCEnet.  This section describes the role of tactical data links 
in FORCEnet. 
The FORCEnet portion of the NTR contains a section entitled Transformational 
Network Concepts and Capabilities – Near-and Mid-Term (2005-2015).48  This section 
contains the following paragraph: 
Naval forces have unique mobility requirements that limit access to 
available network capacity, despite rapid technology advancements.  The 
FORCEnet communications and network architecture includes alternative 
communications paths for essential networks to provide the required 
operational throughput to the warfighters.  The centerpiece is the global 
secure, interoperable family of afloat and ashore IP networks.  Allied and 
Coalition networks will be included within this federation through 
connectivity provided via various gateways and guards, both afloat and 
ashore.  Non-IP Tactical Data Link networks will be included in the 
federation through the creation of a gateway.  Critical warfighting 
information, such as track data, will be able to flow seamlessly between 
the IP network infrastructure and the tactical links.49 
In the role described by the NTR, gateways will allow data to flow between 
tactical data links and the FORCEnet communications network.  In this capacity, tactical 
data links will be capable of supporting FORCEnet in the following areas: 
• Supplementing the common operating picture and common tactical picture by 
providing:  information such as intelligence, imagery, surveillance data, weather, 
threat warnings, etc. 
                                                 
48 Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003 Assured Access & Power Projection From the Sea 
(Department of the Navy, [2003]), 65. 
49 Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003 Assured Access & Power Projection from the Sea 
(Department of the Navy, [2003]), 66. 
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• Providing a backup for the FORCEnet communications network for those 
functions that are supported by the tactical data links.  Functions such as 
exchanging real-time targeting information are not supported by the tactical data 
links and will not be available, but providing a lesser quality common tactical 
picture will be supported. 
• Providing tactical data link formatted information, such as J-series messages, to 
legacy systems on the GIG. 
• Providing a data path from the GIG to tactical data link equipped legacy 
platforms.  GIG nodes could reach these legacy platforms with information such 
as free text, imagery, or intelligence data. 
5. Joint Track Manager 
a. Introduction 
The Joint Track Manager (JTM) is a key component of the Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC) system.  The JTM function is to create a common 
operation picture of sufficient quality to support fire control application for each combat 
control system. JTM attributes consist of integrating track picture, providing high quality 
track data with low distribution latencies, sensor-to-weapon thread management, multi-
dimensional (not warfare domain specific), and common communications links. To 
achieve optimum interoperability across the battleforce, the JTM consist of sensor 
measurement fusion and track management algorithm solutions. In the article, “Open 
Architecture: The Critical Network-Centric Warfare Enabler50”, identifies the JTM is a 
key component in supporting the re-architecting of battle force functionality in order to 
support the Navy's Open Architecture functional architecture. The Navy’s Open 
Architecture vision is to establish a common functional framework across Navy programs 
and platforms to reduce development cost by promoting software reuse and to promote 
interoperability by allowing functionality to be consistently engineered across the 
battleforce.  
Several organizations have been tasked to define a Joint Track 
Management (JTM) Architecture which supports different approaches for processing                                                  
50 Captain Richard T. Rushton, U.S. Navy, Open Architecture: The Critical Network-Centric Warfare 
Enable, http://kcg-inc.net/OPNAV_766/open_architecture_proceedings.htm 
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sensor measurement, attributes, and track related data which forms and identifies tracks. 
The JTM must also be able to support data communication over diverse communications 
channels into different host systems in order to achieve a common tactical track picture, 
and to provide data exchange architecture to integrate the Common Tactical Picture 
(CTP) and Common Operational Picture (COP).  The JTM (see Figure 2-2051), besides 
registering and managing vehicular track information, consists of core common services 
which allows it to fused data from different sources, manage and task resources (weapons 
and sensors), ensures all JTM platforms behave alike, and allows for the discovery of 
movement patterns. 
 
Figure 2-20 Joint Track Manager 
Young’s article, “A C2 System for Future Aerospace Warfare52”, 
summarizes the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) distributed system, which lays the 
foundation upon which advanced forms of Joint C2 are built. Young states, “Advanced 
forms of collaboration among distributed Joint warfighting units require a basic NCW 
foundation comprised of an information architecture that promotes information sharing 
                                                 
51 Open Architecture Track Manager/Joint Track Manager Brief; given by Capt J.M. “Ike” Locovetta, 
diagram was modified to include other enabling technologies, reference slide 7 
52 A C2 System for Future Aerospace Warfare, Bonnie W. Young 
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among distributed units and processing resident at each unit to enable shared 
knowledge.” To accomplish this, Young’s article presents advanced concepts such as 
SIAP distributed system, data fusion, distributed resource management, integrated 
architecture behavior model (IABM). This section summarizes Young’s advanced 
concept.  
b. SIAP Distributed System  
The SIAP Distributed System is composed of a network of distributed 
Peer Computing Programs (PCPs) interacting in a collaborative manner over the Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) network.  The SIAP concept (Figure 2-2153) illustrates multiple peers 
interacting in the context of an operational scenario.  Figure 2-21 also shows these peers 
interfacing with external non-SIAP entities. An individual peer is shown as a single PCP 
and associated warfare resources.   
 
Figure 2-21 SIAP Distributed System Context Diagram 
 
In the SIAP concept, each PCP will use common processing techniques 
including common computational methods and algorithms.  Since each PCP is provided 
with identical data inputs and uses common processing, each will produce the identical 
picture, assessment, and decision results (see Figure 2-2254). These identical pictures are 
                                                 
53 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
54 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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derived from real time and near real time data, and consist of correlated track objects and 
associated information (such as Combat Identification (CID) information).  The PCP 
system fuses real-time and near real-time data to support situation awareness, battle 
management, and target engagement.  The core capabilities of the PCP system include 
target detection, target tracking, and target identification.  The core functions are 
responsible for:  receiving and transmitting sensor measurement data, processing the 
sensor data to generate the single integrated air track picture, and making CID 
determinations for each track object in the identical picture. 
 
 
Figure 2-22 SIAP Common Processing Concept 
 
Figure 2-2355 shows the external interfaces of a single PCP unit.  PCPs 
interface with a warfighting unit’s resident sensors, weapon systems, relevant operator 
displays, and C2 systems.  PCPs interact with each other over the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
network communications architecture.  PCPs communicate with legacy systems 
(warfighting units without PCPs, C2 systems, etc.) over tactical data links.  
                                                 
55 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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Figure 2-23 PCP Context Diagram 
 
The PCP core architecture processing flow is illustrated in Figure 2-2456. 
The track management function is capable of fusing data from several different sources 
including peer-to-peer networks, tactical data links (Link-11/Link-16), and sensors and is 
designed to reduce the likelihood of dual tracking, track blooming, and tracking conflicts. 
                                                 
56 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 







































C2 Interface  
























Figure 2-24 PCP Core Architecture 
 
The two key PCP capabilities that support future Joint C2 concepts are:   
1) To automate the composition of a shared, accurate, and complete situational 
awareness picture 
2) To automate the decision-making process involved in most effectively managing 
warfare assets (resources).    
c. Data Fusion 
The Data Fusion model was originally introduced by Joint Directors of 
Laboratories (JDL) in 1991.  Data Fusion is defined as the process of combining data to 
refine state estimates and predictions. The JDL data fusion model illustrates the primary 
functions, relevant information and databases, and interconnectivity necessary to perform 
data fusion. JDL further defines data fusion as a "multi-level, multifaceted process 
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dealing with the automatic detection, association, correlation, estimation, and 
combination of data and information from single and multiple sources ".  The word 
"multi-level" refers to the five levels of data fusion in the functional model as shown in 
Figure 2-2557.  
 
Figure 2-25 Data Fusion - 5 Levels 
The definitions of JDL’s five levels of Data Fusion Model are provided in 
the bullets below. 
• (Level 0) Sub-Object Data Assessment and Estimation: pixel/signal 
level data association and characterization. 
• (Level 1) Object Assessment: observation-to-track association, continue 
out state estimation (e.g. kinematics) and discrete state estimation (e.g. 
target type and ID) and prediction. At this level, fused data is used to 
determine the identity and other attributes of entities. The term entity 
refers here to a distinct object. A track is usually directly based on 
detections of an entity, but can also be indirectly based on detecting its 
actions. The product from this level is called the situation picture. That 
is, Level 1 tries to determine the what (identification), where (position) 
and when (time) of a detected object.  Level 1 is usually partitioned into 
four functions: data alignment, association, tracking and identification 
(Hall, 1992). The data alignment function is used to project data into a 
common reference frame.  Association tackles the problem of sorting or 
                                                 
57 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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correlating observations into groups, with each group representing data 
related to a single entity.  Tracking refers to the estimation of the 
position and velocity of the entity. Identification seeks to better 
describe the entity.  
• (Level 2) Situation Assessment: object clustering and relational 
analysis, to include force structure and cross force relations, 
communications, and physical context, etc.  The iterative process of 
fusing the spatial and temporal relationships between entities to group 
them together and form an abstracted interpretation of the patterns in 
the order of battle data.  
• (Level 3) Impact Assessment: threat intent estimation, event prediction, 
consequence prediction, susceptibility and vulnerability assessment. At 
this level, iterative process of fusing the combined activity and 
capability of enemy forces to infer their intentions and assess the threat 
that they pose. The product from this level is called the threat 
assessment.  
• (Level 4) Process Refinement: adaptive search and process (an element 
of resource management), tasking. Level 4 performs "process 
refinement", which is an ongoing monitoring and assessment of the 
fusion process to refine the process itself and to regulate the acquisition 
of data to achieve optimal results (Klein, 1993)58.  Level 4 interacts 
with each of the other levels. 
Figure 2-26 shows how objects flow through the levels of Data Fusion.  At 
level 0, objects, depicted as alerts, are picked up and processed by sensors. The object 
information is then passed to the feature extraction process (level 1) for identification.  
The pattern processing then determines the intent of the object by comparing it against 
known patterns. The information is then analyzed in the situation assessment process 
(level 2) and finally passed to the decision making process (level 3).   
                                                 
58 L. A. Klein. Sensor and data fusion concepts and applications. Tutorial texts, vol. TT 14, SPIE 





Figure 2-26 Data Fusion Levels 0-3 
The diagrams and descriptions in the previous paragraphs cover the levels 
of data fusion in the JDL model.  One important aspect of using the model is to 
understand that not all functions at each level are used in every evaluation.  For example, 
if a detected object undergoes object assessment/feature extraction during level 1 data 
fusion, it is certainly possible to make a threat assessment and determine a course of 
action without performing any pattern processing.  One should not infer that there is a 
rigid structure to performing data fusion where all activities of a lower level must be 
completed prior to moving to the next level.  
(1) Functional Requirements 
Figure 2-2759 shows the flow of the JDL Data Fusion Model. The figure shows 
entities external to the peers such as sensors, weapons, decision-makers, Intel/weather 
data sources, and the other warfighting units.  The diagram does not show 
communications interfaces or peer functionality involved in communications.   
Beginning with the sensors, raw measurement data is passed to both the tracking 
and combat ID function and the warfighting resource assessment function.  The objective 
                                                 
59 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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of the tracking and combat ID (CID) function is to assess the kinematics and other 
characteristics of detected objects.  Once enough information is obtained for the object 
(kinematics, characterization, and kinematics prediction), it is then passed to the object 
context assessment function as a real track. The tracking and CID functions constitute 
levels 0 and 1 in the JDL fusion model.   
 
 
Figure 2-27 Data Fusion Process 
 
Several of the function sets shown in Figure 2-27 provide situational awareness—
object context assessment, threat evaluation, warfighting resource assessment, 
environment assessment, wargaming, C2 situation assessment, and Distributed Resource 
Management.  These functions support the development of a higher level of awareness of 





(a) Data Fusion (Level 2) Situational Assessment 
Bonnie Young, in her article, “A C2 System for Future Aerospace Warfare60”, 
provides detailed information on the JDL Data Fusion Process.  This section summarizes 
the key points about data fusion from Young’s article.   
Situational Awareness (SA) is the act of understanding the totality of the tactical 
situation, including the threat, the defended assets, the readiness of warfighting resources, 
and command and control constraints within which the systems must operate. There are 
various aspects of the operational situation (see Figure 2-2861) that comprise SA.  Each 
peer will effectively create and maintain a “picture” of each of these aspects including a 
track picture, object context, threat picture, defended assets picture, warfighting 
resources, environment picture, and the C2 situation.  The pictures are really sets of 
information that are products of the data fusion process. 
 
Figure 2-28 Data Fusion - Level 2 
 
                                                 
60 Bonnie W. Young, A C2 System for Future Aerospace Warfare  
61 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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Object Context Assessment 
Object context assessment examines the group behavior of the objects and the 
operational context of the objects.  This process estimates and predicts relationships 
among entities to include force structure, cross-force relations, communications, and 
physical context.  The input to this functional domain includes track datasets or states on 
a “per object” basis and types of C2 dataset information applicable to providing the 
operational context to the area of interest.  Prior to object context assessment, each object 
has been examined individually—the kinematics and characterization have been assessed 
for each individual aerospace object.  Within the object context assessment domain, the 
kinematics and characterization of the group behavior of a set of aerospace objects is 
assessed.  From this assessment, individual object characterizations may be refined and 
additional information concerning objects may be attained. Table 2-462 shows the 
functionality of object context assessment as well as the input and output. 
 
Table 2-4 Object Context Assessment Functions 
Function Description 
Object Association Object association develops hypotheses for associations among aerospace objects.  
Associations among objects are estimated based on relationships including temporal 
relationships, geometrical proximity, communication links, and functional 
dependence.  Examples of object associations include:  a set of tracked aerospace 
objects representing ballistic missile deployment phase targets and penetration aids; 
a set of tracked objects representing a squadron of fighter aircraft; and a set of blue 
force aerospace objects that are part of the defended assets picture. 
Group Behavior 
Assessment 
Group behavior assessment analyzes the behavior of a hypothesized group of 
associated objects.  Assessments include group and object characterization by 
comparisons of the kinematic behavior to templates.  Also includes event/activity 
aggregation, which establishes relationships among diverse entities in time to 
identify meaningful events or activities. 
Object Refinement The refinement or modification of a particular aerospace object’s characterization 
or identification based on the results of group behavior assessment. 
Physical Context The development and maintenance (updating) of a database or “picture” of the 
                                                 
62 Bonnie Young, article “The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies:  A C2 System 
for Future Aerospace Warfare”, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 
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Function Description 
Database Development operational situation based on the fusion and association of the track picture with 
non-kinematic tactical information.  This capability also includes contextual 
interpretation/fusion, which provides an analysis of an individual aerospace object’s 
or group’s relationship with the evolving contextual situation including weather, 
terrain, sea-state or overland conditions, enemy doctrine, and socio-political 
considerations.  Context correlation fuses multi-source (kinematic, ID, parametric 
and geographic) information. 
Discrimination Discrimination refers to the set of algorithms and methods involved in 
distinguishing the re-entry vehicle in a complex missile threat from chaff and 
penetration aids. 
Kill Assessment Kill assessment assesses the effectiveness of an intercept of an enemy aerospace 
object based on real-time sensor input (i.e., kinematic change, change in signature).  
Related functionality includes:  engagement status tracking (which monitors the 
progress of the current engagement situation) and battle damage assessment (which 
analyzes post-engagement and offensive action data to determine the effectiveness 
of blue force battle damage inflicted on red forces or red force defended assets). 
Non-Kinematic Tactical 
Information Management 
“Non-Kinematic Tactical Information” includes tactically-relevant information that 
is non-kinematic and of a non-sensor-processed nature.  It may include intelligence, 
imagery, voice data, and context information (e.g., commercial air and shipping 
lanes, political and cultural boundaries (observed countries of threat origin and 
countries of over flight, etc.), geographical items of interest, etc.).  This functionality 
manages and fuses this information into forms that support tactical operations. 
Defended Assets 
Database/Assessment 
This functionality develops a defended assets “picture” within the area of interest 
that includes all defended aerospace objects and zones as well as points or areas on 
the ground.  A “defense level” or prioritization is assigned based on established 
doctrine and/or operator input.  The purpose of keeping track of all defended assets 
in the air and on the ground is to feed into the process of prioritizing threats, which 
ultimately supports the optimized use of warfighting resources.  The defended assets 
information set can also be displayed to operators and commanders in order to allow 
them to easily change prioritizations as necessary.  This information set also 





The threat evaluation process determines what objects are candidates for 
engagement or defensive action, determines whether engagements or actions are allowed, 
and assigns priorities to those objects designated as threats.  The threat evaluation process 
uses a number of inputs including the following:  augmented track states that include a 
track’s characterization (track category, type, and ID information), the track’s kinematic 
profile, overt behavior exhibited by the track, and non-kinematic tactical information 
such as intelligence data. 
Warfighting Resource Evaluation 
Another aspect of situational awareness is the evaluation of warfighting resources.  
This involves the management of information related to the sensors and weapons of each 
unit and the assessment of their capabilities in particular operational situations.  
Specifically, this evaluation provides the health, status, configuration, and capability 
(HSCC) of these resources.  Table 2-563 describes this data in more detail.  In addition to 
the HSCC data, this evaluation of warfighting resources requires the environmental 
picture, the threat picture, and resource task sets. 
 




Health Information regarding a resource’s ability to perform optimally.  (For example, a 
sensor’s health data may include its current registration, alignment, and 
calibration information as well as information regarding whether its operation is 
degraded.)   
Status Information regarding a resource’s current tasking and thus, availability for 
future tasking.    
Configuration Information regarding a resource’s mode and configuration.  (For example, a 
resource may be on, off, in standby, etc.; additionally a sensor may be in a 
search or track mode, etc.) 
Capability A static information set that includes a resource’s capabilities (functional and 
performance) and limitations based on various environments, configurations, 
and threats or tasks.    
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Warfighting resource evaluation is performed by every participant unit in the 
battle force. This important capability is a critical part of developing effective and timely 
resource tasking for network-centric warfare missions.  Each unit must assess the health, 
status, configuration and capability of each resource.  Each unit then uses this 
information to fulfill operational missions. 
Command and Control Situation Awareness 
C2 situation awareness is the capability to maintain a shared awareness among the 
entire battle force.  Every participant unit would be aware of various levels in the 
warfighting chain of command involved in battle management and force command.  
Basically, it involves the creation of a picture or awareness of the current C2 situation.  
The C2 picture focuses mainly on the state of affairs of friendly forces and warfighting 
resources.  It depicts the deployment or mission status of units showing aircraft on strike 
missions or land or sea based units in surveillance modes, for example.  It will also show 
the status of which units are operating as a distributed system and which are stand-alone. 
PCP Evaluation 
PCP evaluation is the ability of a set of distributed peers to monitor the individual 
and group performance of a peer or set of collaborating peers.  The performance of PCPs 
and PCP collaborations constitute an important aspect of the operational situation. 
(b)  Data Fusion (Level 3) Impact Assessment 
In the impact assessment process, all participant units will perform threat intent 
estimation, event prediction, consequence prediction, and susceptibility and vulnerability 
assessments as shown in Figure 2-2964. 
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Impact Assessment
Level 3 Data Fusion
Environment Prediction
Predict environmental situation for AOI 
Wargaming – Event/Consequence Prediction
Threat prediction (threat cues, etc.)
Identify, evaluate, & prioritize blue force COA
Evaluate effects of C2 inputs on blue force COA
Predict & evaluate enemy COA & intent
Historical Trend Analysis
Warfighting Resource Projection
Prediction of sensors, weapons, & 
warfighting units performance
Status & capability prediction
Force Projection
Prediction of Force Readiness
Prediction of overall force readiness & capabilities
 
Figure 2-29 Data Fusion - Level 3 
Data Fusion (Level 3) Situation Prediction 
Figure 2-3065 shows the functions associated with situation prediction.  Situation 
prediction is used to estimate the enemy course of action (COA) and the potential impacts 
of the COA on the plans of the battle force.  Situation prediction is performed using 
Automated Management Aids (AMA) to predict real-time, near real-time and non-real-
time operational situations based on blue and red hypothesized COAs. The following 
functions are used in the situation prediction process: environment prediction, 
warfighting resource projection, wargaming, and force projection.  
 
Figure 2-30 Data Fusion Level 3 - Situation Prediction Functionality 
Environmental Prediction 
Environmental Prediction produces Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) 
weather forecasts based on current and historical conditions.  The forecast is used to 
estimate the effects of weather on weapon and sensor performance and to determine the 
feasibility of their use for potential operational missions. 
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Warfighting Resource Projection 
The projection of warfighting resource capabilities into the future based on 
hypothesized COAs is an important part of wargaming.  This function set maintains an 
information database of resource capabilities in various operational and environmental 
conditions. 
Wargaming or Event/Consequence Prediction 
The ability to predict enemy COAs provides great advantage to the warfighter.  
Assigning quantitative confidence values to potential COAs will support other advanced 
C2 capabilities such as collaborative planning and resource management.  
(c) Data Fusion (Level 4) Process Refinement 
At Level 4 of JDL Data Fusion model, the Distributed Resource Management 
(DRM) function monitors and allocates the battleforce’s resources (sensors, weapons, and 
C2) based on the situation (Figure 2-3166). The Distributed Resource Management 
function is further discussed in section Resource Managing and Tasking. 
 
Figure 2-31 Data Fusion - Level 4 
d. Resource Managing and Tasking 
The Resource Manager operates in Level 4 of the Data Fusion Model, but 
because of the importance of this capability this section is devoted to describing it. As 
stated in Young’s article, Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare, “the 
Resource Manager is the key to enabling and optimizing the use of distributed resources 
for collaborative and integrated fire control”.   The Resource Manager is the function that 
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prioritizes tasks and selects the optimum sensor and weapon resources to that task. To 
perform this task, the Resource Manager requires the outputs of the situation assessment 
and situation prediction functions.  Using these outputs, the Resource Manager selects the 
most suitable resource for a specific task.  This selection is based on the prioritized 
threats, the best estimated blue force COA, and operational situation (i.e., environment, 
defended assets locations, etc.). 
If the Resource Manager is unable to assign a resource to a task, based on 
the availability of the resource at that given time, the Resource Manager must reprioritize 
the task list.  The main advantage of the Resource Manager capability is that it enables 
each distributed unit to determine the best use of each resource in the “force” (or within a 
set of collaborating peers) and to make this determination in a near-simultaneous manner.  
In this way, resources can be used for force needs rather than just for the needs of an 
individual unit. The basic concept of the Resource Manager is that every participating 
warfighting unit will effectively be able to produce the same decision results; given that 
each unit receives similar information.  
The Resource Manager is the key that enables the Integrated Fire Control 
(IFC) concept. The Resource Manager determines the best sensor and weapon systems 
based on several factors including available resources, weapons characteristic, and sensor 
capabilities.  The Resource Manager will construct a list of primary and backup 
resources.  Each Resource Manager must compare their results with the results of the 
other units to identify and correct any discrepancies. This step is necessary to ensure that 
each unit generates the same decision recommendations, particularly when the 
commitment of distributed resources is critical, as is the case for IFC. 
Traditionally, the control of the weapons and sensors systems has been the 
responsibility of the officer in charge of the local units in the battle group. The Resource 
Manager distributes this command authority to all individual units. Every participating 
unit’s Resource Manager will generate a list of all available resource for assignment but 
there will still be an ability for an individual unit to override the resource availability and 
tasking if need so.  
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e. Integrated Architecture Behavior Model (IABM) 
Since all participating units are exchanging sensor and status data, the 
expectation is that each U.S. and Coalition unit will generate the same Operational 
Picture and will make the same threat assessments and resource assignments.  To 
accomplish this goal, each platform must process information in the same manner.  The 
Joint Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) Systems Engineering Organization (JSSEO) 
has been tasked to develop a behavior model, known as the Integrated Architecture 
Behavior Model (IABM). JSSEO is defining the IABM’s critical design elements to be 
incorporated in the applications of “common services” and vehicular track establishment, 
management, and identification.  The IABM will be developed in a format which will 
support all joint information systems in the network-centric environment to establish and 
maintain a single coherent tactical command and control environment. The IABM will 
reside on each participating unit or peer and will ensure each unit uses common 
computational methods and algorithms. The concept is that each participating unit is 
given identical sets of data/information and will produce the identical picture, threat 
assessments, and resource allocations. 
As illustrated in IABM PCP Network diagram (see Figure 2-3267) the 
distributed system consists of multiple peers interacting and interfacing with external 
non-SIAP entities such as legacy systems.  An individual peer is shown as a single PCP 
with associated warfare resources.  
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Figure 2-32 IABM PCP Network 
JSSEO’s plans are to take the relevant elements of the IABM, specifically 
those associated with common services and joint track management, and couple them 
with maritime tracking requirements in surface (land and sea) and sub-surface vehicles to 
form the "Open Architecture Joint Track Management" capability. 
f. Data Mining 
During military operations, all contacts (tracks) that are potential enemy 
targets are carefully monitored. This function is tedious but very important for the Joint 
battle force. Knowing the position of enemy tracks allows the U.S. and Coalition Forces 
to strike quickly and ensure the success of their mission. During a major operation, the 
number of tracks that must be monitored can be significant.  Determining the intent of an 
enemy track with an operator display that is saturated with tracks is even more difficult.   
One possible way to address the issue of determining an enemy track’s 
intent is by implementing artificial intelligence (AI) into the JTM.  Such an approach has 
been proposed by the JSSEO group. The AI feature would automatically determine the 
intent of the enemy track based on known patterns.  If it is determined the enemy track 
has hostile intentions, the U.S. and Coalition Force would be placed on high alert.  This 
capability is known as data mining.  
Data mining, sometimes referred to as knowledge discovery, is the process 
of analyzing data from different perspectives and summarizing it into useful information.  
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The data mining process, shown in Figure 2-3368, accepts inputs from multiple databases.  
These databases are integrated into the data warehouse. Data warehousing is defined as a 
process of centralized data management and retrieval.  Data warehousing represents an 
ideal vision of maintaining a central repository of all organizational data.  Centralization 
of data is needed to maximize user access and analysis.  Potential enemy tracks are 
analyzed against known patterns and any new patterns would be considered hostile and 
given immediate attention.  Automated discovery of previously unknown patterns helps 














Figure 2-33 Data Mining Process 
The most commonly used techniques in data mining are:  
• Artificial neural networks: Non-linear predictive models that learn through 
training and resemble biological neural networks in structure.  
• Decision trees: Tree-shaped structures that represent sets of decisions. These 
decisions generate rules for the classification of a dataset. Specific decision tree 
methods include Classification and Regression Trees (CART) and Chi Square 
Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID).  
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• Genetic algorithms: Optimization techniques that use processes such as genetic 
combination, mutation, and natural selection in a design based on the concepts of 
evolution.  
• Rule induction: The extraction of useful if-then rules from data based on 
statistical significance. 
(2) Data Fusion and Data Mining Operations 
Edward Waltz, in his article titled Information Understanding: Integrating Data 
Fusion and Data Mining Process,69 show the functional processes of an integrated data 
mining and fusion model.  This model is shown in Figure 2-3470.  Real-time data, 
represented by the three sources lines, build three operational databases. This is the first 
level (level 0) of the data fusion model. The output of the process is a real-time 
visualization of the present situation. Relevant data is then extracted, transformed and 
loaded into a long-term data warehouse. The data from the warehouse data goes through 
the data cleaning and transformation process to a common multidimensional data set to 
allow entity-relationship clustering by a data mining engine. The mining process allows 
faint and complex signatures to be discovered, modeled and validated for insertion back 
into the data fusion pipeline.  
                                                 
69 Waltz, Edward L., “Information Understanding: Integrating Data Fusion and Data Mining 
Processes”, IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and System, 1997 
70 Waltz, Edward L., “Information Understanding: Integrating Data Fusion and Data Mining 
Processes”, IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and System, 1997 
 59
 
Figure 2-34 Co-processing of Abductive/Inductive (Data Mining) and Data 
Fusion Operations  
James Llinas and Christopher Bowman, in their article Revisiting the JDL Data 
Fusion Model II71, state that there are several challenges to incorporating Waltz’s 
abductive/inductive techniques into a robust and automated data mining-fusion system. 
One concern is the development of a reliable method for automated discovery of relevant 
patterns in the flow of real-time data. Even if that capability exists, there is still a concern 
whether the decisions and/or actions would be taken on the basis of the discovery of such 
a pattern – this is a concept of employment issue, and is related to the reliability of such 
discoveries.  
6. Acoustic Networks Undersea FORCEnet Connectivity Using Seaweb 
a. Introduction 
When the submarine is operating in the domain of a deployed Seaweb 
infrastructure, Undersea FORCEnet connectivity can be maintained through Seaweb.  
Seaweb is networked undersea acoustic communications involving submerged 
submarines, deployable autonomous distributed sensors, and Racom (radio 
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communication) gateway buoys linked to an ashore command center72.  The principle for 
FORCEnet below the ocean surface is to provide the submarine Fleet with two-way 
networked connectivity when operating at tactical depth and speed73.  Undersea 
FORCEnet is a broad spectrum of technology enablers, including advanced acoustic and 
acoustic-RF (radio frequency) communications, high-bandwidth satellite communications 
across all frequency bands. Seaweb enables future naval capabilities in littoral ASW and 
undersea autonomous operations.  A significant dual-use of Seaweb is C3N for 
oceanographic surveys and environmental assessment.  Certainly, a major potential 
benefit of the technology is cross-system, cross-platform, cross-mission interoperability, 
providing enormous added value to otherwise solitary systems.  Seaweb is the underlying 
fabric of an undersea expeditionary sensor grid, and is imperative for dynamic 
interoperable connectivity72. 
b. System Description  
“Seaweb is a distributed grid of interoperable telesonar (i.e. 
telecommunications sound navigation ranging) modems supporting low-power, low-
bandwidth networked undersea communications and node-to-node ranging (Figure 2-35). 
The Seaweb network consists of sensor nodes, repeater nodes and gateway buoys.  
Gateway buoys are equipped with radios for satellite communications (Iridium), line-of-
sight communications (FreeWave), and GPS. The Seaweb architecture enables the 
submarine to communicate and navigate at speed and depth in as much the same way the 
telephone infrastructure supports mobile users terrestrially. Seaweb will link U.S. and 
Coalition/Allied submarines to the GIG and provide the following capabilities74: 
• Global service to meet information exchange requirements anytime, 
anywhere. 
• High availability to support 24/7/365 operations 
• Multiple security levels with information protection and assurance 
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• An end-to-end security architecture providing defense in depth across 
the enterprise 
• Adaptable and self-configuring to operate in mobile environments 
• Hosting of applications and data; 
• Warfighting information transmitted directly to naval users”75. 
 
 
Figure 2-35 Seaweb Distributed Network 
c. System Employment 
Seaweb is deployed in a grid much like a net, the grid is scaleable and its 
relatively short links permit physical-layer communications at high enough frequencies to 
support useful bandwidth, small transducers, directivity, deployable packaging, low 
battery power, and inherent transmission security76.  
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Seaweb networks support asynchronous data communications from 
autonomous nodes to command centers.  On the backlink, Seaweb allows remote 
command and control of instruments associated with the autonomous nodes.  
Additionally, network activity supports acoustic navigation and geolocalization of 
undersea nodes as a natural by-product of telesonar ranging signals.  More generally, 
Seaweb networking permits wireless acoustic transmissions between member nodes in 
the network using established routes or via an intervening cellular node.  Seaweb 
technology provides an undersea C3N infrastructure for various applications77. 
The initial motivation for Seaweb is a requirement for wide-area 
surveillance in littoral waters by the DADS application, and by related surveillance 
applications involving autonomous undersea sensors.  These sensors typically operate in 
50- to 300-m waters with node spacing of 2 to 5 km.  Sensor nodes in a DADS grid 
generate concise ASW contact reports that Seaweb routes to a master node for field-level 
data fusion78.  Primary network packets are contact reports with about 1000 information 
bits79.  DADS sensor nodes asynchronously produce these packets at a variable rate 
dependent on the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) for a particular sensor suite 
and mission.  The master node communicates with manned command centers via 
gateway nodes such as a Racom sea-surface buoy linked with space satellite networks.  
Following ad hoc deployments, DADS relies on the Seaweb network for self-
organization including node identification, clock synchronization on the order of 0.1 to 
1.0 s, node geo-localization on the order of 100 m, assimilation of new nodes, and self-
healing following node failures.   
As a fixed grid of inexpensive interoperable sensor nodes and repeater 
nodes, DADS is consistent with the most fundamental Seaweb operating mode based on a 
stable topology that periodically adjusts itself to optimize overall network endurance and                                                  
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quality of service (QoS).  The fixed Seaweb topology provides an underlying cellular 
network suited for supporting an autonomous oceanographic sampling network 
(AOSN)80, including C3N for autonomous operations with UUV mobile nodes.  The 
cellular architecture likewise provides seamless connectivity for submarine operations at 
speed and depth in a manner not unlike terrestrial cellular telephone service for 
automobiles81. 
d. Coalition Force Utilization 
The goal of the Undersea FORCEnet when utilized by Coalition forces is 
to multiply the effectiveness of the submarine platforms in support of Coalition, Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and Global War On Terror 
(GWOT) warfare by enabling two-way communications and network-centric warfare 
while optimally engaged in the assigned mission. Seaweb will increase the operational 
capabilities of the submarine platforms by allowing it to maintain its stealth posture while 
supporting these various missions all while linking the allied or Coalition force to the 
Global Information Grid allowing all participants to draw on a common operational 
picture. Undersea FORCEnet is the link to increased operational capabilities of undersea 
Coalition operations that will include combined Special Operations Missions (SOF) 
combined anti-submarine operations and provide decisive firepower. Undersea 
FORCEnet will increase the ability to protect allied and Coalition force navies by 
assuring information and fire control systems are in sync and conducting the most 
effective warfare operations. Undersea FORCEnet will increase the U.S.  and Coalition 
forces by ensuring the following82: 
• Projecting and sustaining combined force operations in distance access 
or area- denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial 
threats. 
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• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, 
tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike, 
through a combination of complementary engagement methods against 
critical targets both mobile and fixed in all weather and terrains.  
e. Seaweb Summary 
Seaweb is the undersea FORCEnet connection to the GIG.  Seaweb is a 
foundational FORCEnet capability.  Dynamic, interoperable connectivity will be 
achieved through provisioning of a secure backplane of communications systems.  
Capabilities such as data networks and information systems that form a global Naval 
Information Grid will be fully integrated with the other Services and Countries into the 
GIG.  As previously stated, FORCEnet is the Navy’s link to the GIG.  This Naval grid is 
envisioned as a ubiquitous network that provides a host of services with high availability, 
reliability, and survivability across the Naval enterprise in airborne, afloat, ashore and 
undersea domains. U.S. and Allied/Coalition Interoperability can be made more effective 
by using Seaweb in undersea/submarine operations83. 
Seaweb can help meet the U.S. Allied/Coalition diverse Warfighter 
communications needs through networked acoustic transmissions between member nodes 
using established routes or via an intervening cellular node.  Seaweb technology provides 
an undersea C3N infrastructure for all applications that will provide seamless 
communications among Warfighters data across the U.S. military services, and with 
Coalition forces and allies. These attributes are supported by the physical infrastructure 
and the data link protocols that combine to provide FORCEnet communications and 
specific network applications (e.g., ISR networks, weapons networks etc.) that comprise 
the networks that ride on the communications framework along with required routing, 
access and authentication84. 
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C. LIMITATIONS AND GAPS OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
John Luddy discusses limitations of Network-Centric Warfare in his article85, 
“The Challenge and Promise of Network-Centric Warfare.” Mr. Luddy identifies seven 
areas where limitations exist, but only three (technical, operational, and intelligence) are 
of a concern to C4ISR.   The other limitations deal with doctrines, training, and strategic 
employing of NCW.  Mr. Luddy identifies bandwidth is a technical limitation. As was 
stated, “bandwidth is the information-carrying life blood of any network, and network-
centric operations devour signal bandwidth.”  As demand for information increases, 
network-centric operations will constantly require more communication bandwidth. 
Bandwidth will have to be managed more efficiently, and will require better 
communication technology. 
Another technological concern for the network of sensors is the vulnerability to 
jamming. Enemy forces will make every attempt to disable the battle force network either 
through deception or denial.  Because technology is always vulnerable, and frequently 
fragile, networks must be durable, flexible and redundant. 
Another operational limitation, ironically, is too much information. Generally 
more data is better but too much data can also lead to difficulties. A flood of information 
from different sensors and sources can be overwhelming and as Mr. Luddy states, “too 
much information may cause commanders to tune out.”   
One of the greatest limitations facing NCW is the constant challenge to obtain 
continuous up to date intelligence information. Luddy states that network-centric 
operations will depend on comprehensive intelligence collection, management and 
analysis. One noted shortfall in recent operations was the lack of persistent (day/night, 
all-weather) battlespace sensor coverage.  It has been a challenge to make UAVs better 
and equipped with more capable sensors to improve this shortfall.  
Ultimately, a constellation of spaced-based radar (SBR) satellites may provide the 
most significant sensor improvement in decades.   The Pentagon still has to prove that 
SBR can be integrated with other assets, tasked effectively and responsively by 
warfighters, strategic analysts and planners, and acquired on a realistic schedule and 
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budget. Finally, no advance in technology or its efficient use can compensate for 
inadequate human intelligence (HUMINT).  In the drive toward increased network-
centric operations, and better and faster sensors, the need for accurate HUMINT should 
not be neglected.  
D. C4ISR SUMMARY 
As stated by Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, in their article 
“Network-Centric Warfare86 : Its Origin and Future,” Network-Centric Warfare derives 
its power from the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed 
force. The enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all 
appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed 
of response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes--to include high-speed 
automated assignment of resources to need--and integrated sensor grids closely coupled 
in time to shooters and C2 processes.” 
Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to 
the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics.  It is transparent to mission, force size 
and composition, and geography. 
As the U.S. Armed Forces increases their network-centric focus, the failure of our 
Coalition to do likewise could prove a serious obstacle to the success of future Coalition 
efforts. A few of the Coalition nations have explored networked operations in one form 
or another. Some have changed their forces to a network-centric organizational concept, 
but these efforts are very limited. Coalition members are changing to provide “niche” 
capabilities rather than trying to match the U.S. system for system. Future Coalitions will 
have to incorporate varying levels of technological sophistication, and support it with 
training, exercises, doctrine and resources.  If U.S. forces become unable to reliably 
communicate with Coalition forces, U.S. leaders might well be justified in fighting alone. 
This dilemma must be avoided. The U.S. must make every effort to encourage its allies to 
pace their network-centric modernization with its own, perhaps with carefully 
constructed joint ventures between U.S. and Coalition governments.  A “NATO 
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standard” for communications protocol and software would be a good start. From there, 
procurement and deployment benchmarks should be established. 
Future advances in Joint aerospace warfare depend largely on Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW) solutions that enable new and enhanced forms of Command and Control 
(C2).  The role of C2 in aerospace operations is to optimize the use of offensive and 
defensive resources to combat aerospace threats.  NCW-enabled C2 will enhance time-
critical aerospace operations by enabling the use of distributed warfare assets in 
collaborative missions that optimize their use for Force-level priorities.  A primary 
example of a collaborative C2 capability is Integrated Fire Control (IFC) or the tactical 
engagement of aerospace threats using distributed warfare assets.   Selecting the best 
shooter from a set of geographically distributed firing units improves the chances of 
intercepting targets (by selecting optimal engagement geometries) and improves the 
economy of weapon resources (by eliminating multiple redundant shots).  For complex 
threat environments in which many aerospace targets exist, collaborative fire control may 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
The analysis focuses on determining a system architecture, what benefit 
FORCEnet (Fn) will provide to Coalition forces, and also the benefit of Fn to a joint 
Coalition task force (AUSCANNZUKUS).  Identification of the requirements for 
implementing FORCEnet is also analyzed.  
To show the improvement between Fn and the traditional platform-centric 
operation, a model must be built to simulate this new Fn concept.  The objective of the 
modeling and simulation is to model FORCEnet enabling methods and concepts. These 
methods and concepts include netted sensors with cueing, data fusion and resource 
management, and integrated fire control.  In the research conducted, the Fn modeling for 
the three vignettes in the scenario are: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface 
Warfare (ASuW), and Anti-Surface Missile Defense (ASMD) and are summarized in 
Table 3-1.  The scenario involves both the United States (U.S.) and the Coalition forces. 
Table 3-1 FORCEnet Composition 
Scenario Objective Blue Force Red Force Fn Level 
ASW ESG/CSG aims 
to localize the 
Red force 
submarines 
1 MPA, 1 SSN, LFAS and 
deployable barrier sensors 













3 LCS, 1 SSN, 2 DDG, 2 
Coalition FFG/DDG, 
MPA/AWACS/UAV/helos
















3 LCS, 2 DDG, 2 
Coalition FFG/DDG, 1 












The modeling and simulation performed shows the benefit to the United States 
Navy, and Coalition forces if they were to implement FORCEnet into their navies.  This 
report explores the possible benefits for Coalition forces, as well as the United States 
Navy, in terms of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance 
(MOP) as they relate to an operational scenario.  Discussion of the possible capability 
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improvements for Coalition forces, provided through the implementation of FORCEnet, 
and how it would benefit their navies in a non-Coalition exercise follow. 
Steps for the implementation of the FORCEnet capabilities so that Coalition 
forces can interact as a single force in the planning and execution of the force protection 
and force projection requirements are stated.  The Coalition force addressed within this 
study is bounded by the AUSCANNZUKUS Coalition, made up from the forces of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States navies.   
The implementation of FORCEnet for Coalition forces through the development 
of a Coalition Force Architecture and the use of policy and procedures for implementing 
the architecture is also discussed.  The identification of specific systems was minimized 
so that the focus of the study would be on the Coalition FORCEnet architecture itself. 
A. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Many current National and Naval policy documents notionally describe the 
improvement in warfighting effectiveness which will be achieved through the 
implementation of network-centric Command and Control (C2) capabilities.  It has been 
further suggested that expanding these net-centric C2 capabilities to our Coalition 
partners is a necessary component for the success of the CNO’s vision of a “1,000 ship” 
Navy.  The overall goal of this study is to provide a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
based analysis of these improvements in warfighting effectiveness as provided by 
network-centric Command and Control capabilities.  By evaluating the warfighting 
effectiveness of a given force in a common scenario and altering the attributes of their C2 
capabilities, we will be able to quantitatively assess the direct contributions of these C2 
capabilities to the overall effectiveness of the force. 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
No system, System of Systems (SoS), or Family of Systems (FoS) should exist or 
come into being without a definition of need.  The need should drive technology and the 
solution, not the inverse, trying to make square pegs fit into round holes.   Developing a 
system only when a need is identified is the primary tenet of Systems Engineering. 
Traditional engineering design methods are based on a bottom-up 
approach.  Starting with a set of known elements, design engineers create 
the product or system by synthesizing a combination of system elements.  
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However, it is unlikely that the functional need will be met on the first 
attempt unless the system is simple.  After determining the product’s 
performance and deviation from what is required, the elements and their 
combination are altered and performance determined again.  This bottom-
up process is iterative, with the number of iterations (and design 
efficiency) determined by the experience and creativity of the designer, as 
well as by the complexity of the product of system.87 
For this study, the need is to determine if FORCEnet provides a measurable 
benefit to Coalition partners, and measured improvement in performance of a joint 
Coalition task force. 
Systems engineering implements a top-down approach in designing a system and 
the process for this project is shown in Figure 3-188.  With a need identified, requirements 
of system behavior are documented.  These requirements not only come from customers, 
but also from users, maintainers, managers, developers, etc…, any stakeholder of the 
system.  The requirements identified must be testable and measurable.  If they are not, 
then the requirements are worthless, and the end system will not have correctly 
implemented the systems engineering discipline.  Additionally, required performance is 
needed, not just required capabilities.  For example, a system capability is to navigate a 
platform, but how accurately the navigation must be is also needed. 
                                                 
87 Blanchard, Benjamin S., Fabrycky, Wolter J., Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd edition; pg. 28 
88 http://www.gmu.edu/departments/seor/insert/robot/robot2.html - accessed 8/7/06 
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Figure 3-1 Systems Engineering Vee Model 
Next, the requirements are decomposed into functions, which are then allocated to 
subsystems.  The decomposition continues until the functions are allocated at the lowest 
level elements or components.  “The use of functional elements is the essential difference 
in systems engineering methodology compared with systems integration.”89  This is 
followed by the final step of the decomposition and definition sequence is the detail 
design of the components. 
Once the detail design of the system components is accomplished, the integration 
and verification sequence can begin.  To verify the system design, the prototype must be 
demonstrated to satisfy client acceptance as well as user satisfaction.  This begins the 
integration and verification sequence of systems engineering. 
Another basic tenet of systems engineering is that the process of developing the 
system is an iterative one, comprised of the endless loop of Synthesis, Analysis, and 
Evaluation as shown in Figure 3-290. 
                                                 




Figure 3-2 Systems Engineering Process 
First, synthesis (design) of the problem to be solved is performed, then an analysis 
of the functional characteristics and finally an evaluation of the current output.  If the 
desired results have not been achieved at this point, the process of synthesis, analysis, and 
evaluation is repeated until success is attained. 
1. Develop Architecture 
For this project, the need is for seamless, near-instantaneous synchronization and 
exchange of information in order to maximize the effectiveness of an Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG) comprised of Coalition forces (AUSCANNZUKUS).  An 
architectural approach to the problem is implemented vice a non-system engineering 
method that would select a system design based upon current technology. 
The selected architecture is based upon a self-synchronizing, self-healing, fully 
netted battleforce.  The battleforce is dependent on the process of data fusion, where data 
from several sources are fused and stored in a single integrated database. Compilation, 
retention and distribution of the database and the data fusion process, is the responsibility 
of designated Super-Nodes and Auxiliary Super-Nodes.  The Integrated Architecture 
Behavior Model (IABM), data mining, and Integrated Fire Control (IFC) are all key 
components in realizing this netted battleforce architecture.  Implementation of the 
proposed components of the architecture will result in an increased speed of command, 
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more effective use of battleforce resources (sensors, weapons, etc…), which in turn 
assures information superiority for the Fn platforms.  Ultimately, Fn will succeed in 
minimizing blue force losses and maximizing the potential of any Coalition force 
structure. 
From a technological perspective today, the United States is fully capable of 
performing the tasks required in defeating most any naval threat, from blue water 
operations to littoral combat and support.  The issue is that the fighting piracy and 
conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEOs) and humanitarian relief as well 
as Coalition operations requires support from the Coaltion.  Politics and common sense 
will not allow, except in a rare instance, the United States to act unilaterally.  Thus, buy-
in and implementation of FORCEnet (Fn) among allied and Coalition partners are 
mandatory. 
The analysis and modeling show that US-only platforms that implement 
FORCEnet have a significant advantage over non-FORCEnet capable platforms (US or 
Coalition).  Analysis of the model also shows a decrease in capabilities when non-Fn 
units are added to a Fn environment. 
Criteria or the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) considered in the modeling 
process include: 
MOE 1 – Engagement Quality 
MOE 2 – Target Detection 
Additional MOEs to be considered for future efforts may include: 
o Connectivity 
o Track Integration 
o Data Exchange 
o Data Registration 
o Information Management 
o Unit Tactical Situational Awareness (SA) 
o Battleforce SA / Common Operational Picture(COP) 
Numerous Measures of Performance (MOPs) were provided in the scenario and 
supporting documentation.  The MOPs used in modeling the selected architecture are 
listed in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2 Measures of Performance 
Grid Measure of Performance (MOP) 
Sensor (Detection) # (targets) detected 
# (targets) not detected 
Command and 
Control (C2) 
total # identified (enemy ship) 
# identified (non-hostile) 
# subs identified 
# subs not (detected on slide)
identified 
# missiles identified 
# missiles leakers 
# tracked via precision cue (all
threats) 
Engagement total # missiles engaged via IFC 
# engaged (platform-centric) 
# enemy killed 
total # of leakers 
# blue hits suffered (if only one
engagement) 
The modeling and simulation results show that Fn provides the following 
improvements: 
o Sensors - 5% improvement in number of threats detected. 
o C2 - 42% improvement in tracking via precision cue (sensor tasking). 
o Engagement - 25% improvement in threat neutralization. 
The analysis shows an increased quality of the information acquired, a robust 
situational awareness shared by the distributed combat elements within the network, and 
improved neutralization of threats to the Joint Coalition Task Force.  
For the purposes of the analysis, M&S efforts were limited to the ASW, ASuW 
and ASMD vignettes.  In each vignette selected for modeling and simulation, 
decomposition of each of the identified missions into their respective functions and tasks 
was necessary.  OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.38A, the UNIVERSAL NAVY TASK 
LIST (UNTL), Figure 3-391, was used, focusing on the Operational and Tactical levels 
outlined in red below. 
 
                                                 
91 OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3500.38A, the UNIVERSAL NAVY TASK LIST (UNTL) 
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Figure 3-3 Universal Navy Task List 
Each of the selected tasks was further decomposed to the next level.  An example 
demonstrating the decomposition of Operational Task 5 – “Provide Operational C2” is 
shown in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4 Lower Level Universal Navy Task List 
Given a representative set of required functions and tasks, these required 
functions and tasks were allocated to the platforms identified in the given force structure 
with the goal of identifying gaps and overlaps in providing the required capabilities.  The 
approach consisted of a subset of the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method 
(Figure 3-5)92 as described in the International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) Systems Engineering Guidebook93 and the ASN(RDA) Naval Capability 
Evolution Process (NCEP)94.  In this approach, the outputs of one matrix become the 
inputs of the subsequent matrix, continuing until the desired output has been attained. 
                                                 
92 Naval Capability Evolution Process Guidebook, Volume 1.  ASN(RDA). Version 1.1, May 2005 
93 Systems Engineering Handbook.  International Council on Systems Engineering.  Version 2a, June 
2004 
94 Naval Capability Evolution Process Guidebook, Volume 1.  ASN(RDA). Version 1.1, May 2005 
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Figure 3-5 Quality Function Deployment Technique 
As described in the NCEP guidebook, QFD matrices can be constructed for each 
of the pairing shown in Figure 3-695. 
                                                 




Figure 3-6 QFD Matrices for Capability-Based Planning 
For demonstration purposes, pairs comparing Platforms versus Tasks is depicted 
in Table 3-3.  This is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of individual platform 
capabilities.  Obviously, smaller platforms are indeed capable of performing each of these 
tasks to varying degrees.  It is rather intended to illustrate that larger platforms will likely 
be required to possess enhanced capabilities to coordinate these tasks between numerous 
platforms spanning great distances across the theater and beyond. 
 80
Table 3-3 Platforms vs. Tasks 















LHD X X X X X
LPD X X X X X
LSD X X X X X
LCS X X X X
DDG X X X X X X X X
CG X X X X X X X X
SSN X X X X X X
TAGOS X X X X
UAV X X X X
Helos X X X X X
Harriers X X X X X
MPA X X X X X
FF X X X X X
FFH X X X X X
FFG X X X X X
DD X X X X X X X X
DDG X X X X X X X X
LPD X X X X X
LSD X X X X X
AOR X X
SSK X X X X X X
P3 X X X X X















Given this high-level list of required functions and tasks, the attributes of the C2 
capabilities required to support these functions and tasks were identified.  An embedded 
list of desired capabilities and attributes is shown in Table 3-4 and explained below.  
Capabilities identified in green exist today.  Capabilities identified in blue are currently 
planned to exist in 2014.  Capabilities identified in red are desired and/or required but are 
not currently planned for fielding.  It is these specific capabilities that need to be pursued 
in order to fully realize the improved warfighting effectiveness of net-centric C2.  While 
again not intended to provide a detailed analysis concerning to what degree a particular 
platform may possess each of the desired traits, this is intended to illustrate the enhanced 
traits required of large, theater-level, C2 platforms.  
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Table 3-4 Capabilities 











LHD X X X X X X X X X X
LPD X X X X X X X X X X
LSD X X X X X X X X X X
LCS X X X X X X
DDG X X X X X X X X X X
CG X X X X X X X X X X
SSN X X X X X X X X
TAGOS X X X X X X
UAV X X X X
Helos X X X X X
Harriers X X X X X
MPA X X X X X X
FF X X X X X X X
FFH X X X X X X X
FFG X X X X X X X
DD X X X X X X X X X X
DDG X X X X X X X X X X
LPD X X X X X X X X X X
LSD X X X X X X X X X X
AOR 
SSK X X X X X X X
P3 X X X X X X X














2. Desired Command & Control (C2) Traits 
This section describes the C2 capabilities listed in Table 3-4, identified as critical 
in supporting FORCEnet.  Some capabilities apply to the Coalition Joint Task Force and 
Global Information Grid participants, while others are primarily CJTF-centric. 
a. Publish 
To publish is to have the ability to expose organic sensor, C2, and weapon 
information for examination and use by other entities attached to the CJTF and the GIG.  
This includes the ability to advertise the data’s availability, as well as the data’s type, 
quality, time, location, and other significant identifying traits. 
b. Subscribe 
Subscribing is the ability of consumers (CJTF or GIG) to collect and 
assemble remote data based on pre-defined data traits.  Data would be automatically 
retrieved based on its type, quality, time, location, and other significant identifying traits. 
c. Cross-Domain 
Cross-domain references the ability to publish, subscribe, process, and 
store data of differing classification and releasability levels.  Data security and 
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availability is automatically governed by business rules determined by each  
user’s  roles,  clearances,  and  affiliations. 
d. Level 4 Data Fusion 
Data fusion is the ability to conduct ongoing monitoring and assessment of 
the overall fusion process, to refine the process itself, and to regulate the acquisition of 
data to achieve optimal results96. 
e. Theater Database 
Positioned aboard the Super-Node, the theater database provides the 
ability to maintain a comprehensive database of all data published or subscribed to by 
theater units is essential to FORCEnet.  This CJTF-based database would, by proxy, serve 
as the repository for all data published by smaller tactical units.  The database is also the 
repository and service provider for many subscription requests from the lesser equipped 
platforms (disadvantaged users).  Should elements outside the theater subscribe to tactical 
sensor data, the theater database would service these requests, precluding the need for 
multiple or redundant requests to the tactical edge platforms and the associated 
bandwidth loading required by those requests.  Likewise, this database would, by proxy, 
subscribe to the superset of data requested by other theater platforms.  Should multiple 
‘Tactical Edge’ platforms subscribe to similar data, these requests would be serviced by 
the theater-database, again precluding the need for multiple redundant requests by 
‘Tactical Edge’ platforms and the associated bandwidth loading. 
f. Self-Synchronizing 
This ability allows Super-Nodes to automatically synchronize among 
multiple theater databases.  While the most capable unit would normally be assigned the 
role of Super-Node, maintaining the primary database, other similarly equipped platforms 
(Auxiliary Super-Nodes) would maintain duplicate, synchronized, theater-databases 
allowing them to assume the Super-Node role in the event of a casualty to the previously 
assigned master.  Synchronization would occur automatically, using underutilized 
bandwidth on existing circuits based on availability. 
 
                                                 
96 L. A. Klein. Sensor and data fusion concepts and applications. Tutorial texts, vol. TT 14, SPIE 
Optical Engineering Press, USA, 131 p., 1993 
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g. Disconnected Operations 
Disconnected operations refer to the ability of individual platforms and 
theater-level forces to operate for periods of time without access to the GIG.  In the event 
of a casualty to SATCOM or other reach-back connectivity to the GIG, theater forces 
must be able to continue operations until connectivity is restored.  The self-synchronizing 
theater-databases previously described could provide this capability. 
h. Line-of-Sight (LOS) Communications 
IBGWN (Intra Battle Group Wireless Network) is an example of a system 
currently demonstrated to provide this capability.  It is the ability to communicate among 
theater platforms using interoperable protocols (including Internet Protocol (IP)) and 
waveforms over various Radio Frequency (RF) paths providing LOS connectivity. 
i. Beyond LOS (BLOS) Communications 
Also known as Extended LOS, this includes the ability to communicate 
among theater platforms using interoperable protocols (including Internet Protocol (IP)) 
and waveforms over various RF paths providing BLOS connectivity within the theater.  
Examples of systems currently demonstrated to provide this capability include High 
Frequency Improvement Program (HFIP), SubNet Relay, and BACN (Battlefield 
Airborne Communication Node). 
j. Reach-Back 
The ability to communicate among global platforms using interoperable 
protocols (including Internet Protocol (IP)) and waveforms over various RF paths 
providing connectivity beyond the theater is known as reach-back.  Reach-back provides 
theater assets their primary connectivity to the GIG. 
Examples of systems currently demonstrated to provide this capability are 
Super High Frequency (SHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) SATCOM, and commercially on Ku/Ka SATCOM 
systems. 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
This section describes the relevant parts of the Family of Joint Future Concepts, 
CONOPS and/or Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned missions to which the desired 
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capabilities contribute, what operational outcomes they provide, what effects they must 
produce to achieve those outcomes, how they complement the integrated joint 
warfighting force and what enabling capabilities are required to achieve the desired 
operational outcomes. 
1. Coalition Scenario 
The scenario was provided in a series of documents each further refining the force 
structure and platform participants.  The most recent of these documents “Coalition 
FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario” Version 0.g dated 20 
January 200697, describes the initial scenario as follows: 
 “The scenario opens with an internationally compelling natural humanitarian 
disaster -public sentiment requires relief action on the part of each nation.  Each nation 
has in the vicinity assets with some dual use capability (naval/humanitarian relief) so 
their initial response can be measured in days not weeks.  The trade space for modeling 
the force is that some portion of the U.S. ESG will not be available.  The injection of the 
Indonesian Naval threat will be evolutionary and will begin after the Nations have 
already very publicly committed to the humanitarian mission, thus removing the 
opportunity to just not participate. 
The Philippines are affected by two large volcanic eruptions affecting the centre 
of the country (Luzon), and the overall disruption leads to a political crisis and change of 
government.  Other nations provide support with humanitarian and disaster relief, but 
whilst this effort gathers pace, Muslim factions in the southern province of Mindanao use 
the opportunity to foment trouble and achieve their own goal of a separate secular state.  
The Coalition support then widens to include peace making/peace enforcement, and the 
U.S. dispatch an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with an amphibious component to 
ensure that disaster relief is not impeded, and to provide additional land support to 
Philippine ground forces facing the insurgents.  In turn this triggers increased support by 
other Southeast Asian countries (previously covert) to the separatists, and their naval 
units (SAG and SSK) attempt to oppose access by the ESG.” 
                                                 
97 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).  Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine 
Comfort Scenario, v0.g.  January 2006 
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2. Vignettes 
The scenario as presented was described in terms of eight independent vignettes 
beginning with ‘Assembly Training Planning and Rehearsal’ and concluding with 













      Metrics are
             MoE1-4
Total of 8 vignette ‘slices’, plus recovery & 
regeneration
Each ‘slice’ is freestanding, and when modelled 
as low level OA, will have MoP/MoE.  These 
calibrate or benchmark          respective parts of 
higher level campaign model, or metrics can be aggregated sideways  


























Figure 3-7 Vignettes 
 
D. FOUR LEVELS OF FORCENET 
FORCEnet maturity has been defined in terms of four specific levels of 
capability.  These levels and their associated capability traits are shown in Figure 3-899. 
                                                 
98 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).  Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine 
Comfort Scenario, v0.g.  January 2006 
99 TTCP MAR AG-6 Brief to Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command. April 24, 2006 
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Figure 3-8 Levels of FORCEnet Capability 
Alternative definitions, used for modeling and simulation purposes in this project, 
were provided in the scenario and are listed in Table 3-5100.   
Table 3-5 ESG composition and FORCEnet levels 
Fn Level    Benefits/Characteristics: 
0 No FORCEnet.  Vessels use voice radio and Link 11 or 16 to share situational 
awareness and C2 data.  Platform-centric in character. 
1 Filtered, delayed, low bandwidth (dialup) FORCEnet (like ‘no FORCEnet’, but 
higher fidelity/faster updates).  ESG/CSG has access to reach back and has the 
ability to distribute intelligence information gained from that to all ESG/CSG 
members.  Information from organic sensor and intelligence data is available 
with some time delay throughout ESG/CSG.  Recognized Maritime Picture 
(RMP) which fuses organic and other ESG/CSG data is distributed with minor 
time delays. 
2 Real-time targeting information gained from any U.S. or Coalition asset/source 
(when latter is technically capable) is available to all ESG/CSG vessels as 
required.  Access to targeting information is assured within understood 
                                                 
100 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).  Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine 
Comfort Scenario, v0.g.  January 2006 
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limitations. Information accuracy, timeliness and coverage continuity are assured 
up to predefined levels.   
Rapidly updated RMP is available to all ESG/CSG vessels. 
3 Weapons systems are networked but are only able to be controlled by national 
authority. 
4 Vessels of all Coalition nations are technically and politically/militarily able to 
offer weapons systems as a network service for command by approved 
authorities from any of the nations within the ESG/CSG/CJTF. 
 
E. COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF) COMPOSITION 
Four force compositions are considered based on the technology and political 
policies implemented by members of the U.S. and Coalition forces.  These four options 
are shown in Table 3-6101. 
 
Table 3-6 Four Options to be Considered 
Option Description Map to Levels in Table 3-5 
I (do nothing)  
 
Small size (all US) ESG force, 
fully Fn capable 
US (level 3) 
No Coalition 
II 
(do minimum)    
Added Coalition ships, but not Fn 
capable (i.e. larger overall force) 
US (level 3) 
Coalition partners (level 0) 
III  Intermediate Fn capability to the 
additional Coalition ships 
US (level 3) 
Coalition partners (levels 1 or 2) 
IV Full Fn capability to entire force US and Coalition Units (level 4) 
 
 
F. THREAT SUMMARY 
1. Threats 
Discussion has identified the requirement for a feasible Coalition scenario, to act 
as the framework for the various modeling efforts and that the Operation Philippine 
Comfort – CJTF scenario, already used for U.S. demonstrations of Fn components, might 
be appropriate.   
Volcanic eruptions in Philippines have caused widespread civilian distress, and 
Naval and Marine forces from the Essex ESG (originally transiting South East Asia en- 
                                                 
101 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).  Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine 
Comfort Scenario, v0.g.  January 2006 
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route to the Arabian Gulf) are diverted.  The U.S. has committed the force to 
Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HA-DR) tasking, involving airlift, medical and 
material requirements.    
Fundamentalist rebels (ASG) remain active on southern Philippine islands, and 
increased force protection measures are applied to all units within the vicinity.  The ESG 
is briefed to anticipate the possibility of providing assistance to U.S. and RP ground 
forces. 
Southeast Asian nations announce support for ASG.  To show its support of 
Mindanao, these countries announce that they will send a naval force northward (SAG) to 
the Sulu Sea, the likely location for a Coalition sea base. 
They do not announce what that force will do once it arrives in the area, but it is 
likely to be based on their recent major sea exercise off the south-eastern point of Borneo.  
This featured: 
• 2 cruisers. 5 frigates, and 1 amphibious ship have been operating as a 
single force, conducting anti-submarine operations against the 2 Kilo 
submarines for about five days   
• The Kilo’s appear to be fairly proficient.  National sensor support 
confirms that the submarines have not returned to port near Jakarta, there 
is no Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) information to confirm their 
whereabouts, and the Kilo positions have been unknown for about 50 
hours102. 
2. Red Order of Battle (OOB) 
2008: The discovery of new oil deposits in the disputed Spratly Islands has led to 
renewed and escalating political tension between the five nations (China, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) that have staked claims in the region. 
2010: International arbiters award the majority claim to the Philippines.  
Indonesia publicly denounces the decision, stating that improper U.S. influence tainted 
the result and tilted the proceedings towards the U.S. ally.  Anti-U.S. Islamic 
Fundamentalist movements in Indonesia continue to grow in intensity. 
2015: Two volcanic eruptions on the main Philippine island of Luzón have 
resulted in a humanitarian crisis and the collapse of the government.  In the midst of the 
                                                 
102 Note: Blue forces refer to Coalition forces. Red forces refer to the enemy. 
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ensuing international disaster relief movement, separatist Muslim factions on the 
southern island of Mindanao, utilizing heretofore covert aid, capitalize on the opportunity 
to stage a revolt. 
In support of the Muslim rebels, a Southeast Asian nation dispatches a naval force 
composed of several frigates, corvettes, patrol boats, an amphibious assault vessel, and 
two diesel-electric submarines. 
The Van Spijk Frigate is a multi-purpose ship that can be deployed in anti-
submarine, anti-aircraft, or surface action roles.  Armament consists of one 76 mm gun 
and 8 SS-N-14 anti-ship cruise missiles that have both anti-ship and anti-air 
capabilities103. 
The Parchim Corvette is an advanced anti-submarine patrol ship.  Armament 
consists of 2 quadruple SA-N-5 (24 missiles), 2 twin 16-in torpedo tubes (400-mm), 4 
KH-35 anti-ship missiles, and several medium caliber machine guns104. 
The Patrol Boat PSK-M is a fast patrol boat whose primary armament consists of 
4 KH-35 anti-ship missiles.  It possesses excellent capabilities in the littorals. 
The Tacoma LST is an amphibious landing ship equipped with two .50 caliber 
machine guns.  Overall military lift capabilities provide for transport of two-hundred 
troops or 1,700 tons of cargo/vehicles105.    
The Kilo SS is a diesel-electric submarine of Russian origin equipped with 8 
Strela-3 (SA-N-8 Gremlin) anti-ship missiles and 18 VA-111 torpedoes.  Primary 
missions include anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare.  The Kilo is considered to be 




                                                 






Table 3-7 Southeast Asian Nation Naval ORBAT 
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Given the nature of the Philippine insurgency, there exists the possibility that 
separatists will augment the above listed naval support with their own asymmetric 
techniques.  Suicide bombings via dhows or light single-prop planes are the likeliest 
scenario. 
G. BATTLEFORCE TRANSFORMATION 
The U.S. Department of Defense is undergoing a rapid transformation in its 
operations it conducts abroad. With the downsizing of U.S. Armed Forces, the need to 
conduct warfare will often consist of both U.S. and Coalition Forces. The need to 
communicate effectively is of high importance. To accommodate this transformation, the 
development of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) has begun.  NCW promises to deliver 
an unprecedented situational awareness through a network community.  For the Navy, the 
NCW concept has evolved into the definition of FORCEnet. This research seeks to 
determine of the FORCEnet concept, through modeling and simulation efforts, 
demonstrating an improved capability for the CJTF. 
Built on results and findings of AG-1 and AG-6, this study of Coalition 
FORCEnet implementation examines the way ahead, realizing Coalition capabilities that 
are compatible with current and future U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet initiatives. 
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This report seeks to define, in functional terms, the various levels of Coalition 
interoperability with FORCEnet and to assess the incremental value of higher levels of 
interoperability to provide input to national balance of investment studies. 
A trans-national need is also recognized to harmonize national Network-Centric 
Maritime Warfare (NCMW) functional and technical roadmaps to support effective 
netted Coalition capabilities and assessment of priorities.  Similar to the series of studies 
sponsored by the TTCP MAR AG-1 and AG-6, the goal of this project is to analyze the 
application of techniques for performing quantitative analysis, and the benefits of a 
network-centric Coalition force using FORCEnet.  The FORCEnet functional concept107 
defines FORCEnet as “the operational construct and architectural framework for Naval 
Warfare in the Information Age, integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force.”108  
This strategic definition can be shared by Coalition Forces.  Primarily this study 
aims to prove that Coalition FORCEnet can accomplish three goals.  First, it will provide 
conceptual, top-down guidance for engineering Coalition FORCEnet.  Second, it 
provides integrated guidance for identifying, justifying, and prioritizing Coalition 
FORCEnet investments both outside and within the Naval Enterprise. Third, it models the 
alignment and integration effort that could be implemented in coordination with other 
Service transformation initiatives and with other efforts across Joint, Department of 
Defense (DoD), Inter-agency, and Multi-national arenas. The San Diego Study Group 
used, developed and applied parametric techniques, and specific modeling and simulation 
of the assigned scenario for analyzing network-centric warfare. Using the data derived 
from the modeling and simulation, the value of Coalition utilization of FORCEnet is 
demonstrated as a force multiplier. 
Topics discussed within this document include: 
1. FORCEnet Enabling Technology 
2. Advantages of Network-Centric Sensors 
3. Advantages of Integrated Fire Control  
                                                 
107 FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century, February 2005 
108 USN/USMC. FROCEnet A FunctionalConcept For The 21st Century 
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4. The Global Information Grid (GIG) Enterprise Services 
5. Tactical Data Links 
6. Data Fusion 
7. Acoustic Networks 
8. Limitations and Gaps of Network-Centric Warfare 
H. FAMILY OF SYSTEMS (FOS)/SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS (SOS) SYNCH 
As stated by Admiral Vern Clark, “FORCEnet is the "glue" that binds together 
SEA STRIKE, SEA SHIELD, and SEA BASE. It is the operational construct and 
architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, 
sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed 
combat force.”109 
FORCEnet will provide the architecture to increase substantial combat 
capabilities through the alignment and integrations of FOS/SOS. The result will 
transform situational awareness, accelerate speed of decision, and produce a greater 
distribution of combat power. FORCEnet allows for real-time enhanced collaborative 
planning among joint and Coalition partners.  
I. INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY/FULL OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY (IOC/FOC) DEFINITIONS 
For the purpose of defining Operational Capability milestones, the four previously 
defined ‘Levels of FORCEnet’, as shown in Figure 3-9110, will be used.  Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) will be attained when the first U.S. Super-Node is equipped 
with FORCEnet Level 3 capabilities, and associated offboard transport and services 
infrastructures are deployed in an operational environment.  Based on current 
development and fielding plans, it is anticipated that this will occur in FY 2014. 
Full Operational Capability (FOC) for the U.S. Navy will be attained when all 
identified Super-Node platforms past D-30 (months) in the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) 
cycle have been equipped with FORCEnet Level 3 capabilities, and offboard transport 
and services infrastructures are globally available. Based on current development and 
                                                 
109 Clark, V. (2003).  2003 Human Systems Integration Symposium 
110 TTCP MAR AG-6 Brief to Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command. April 24, 2006 
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fielding plans, as well as deployment and availability schedules, it is anticipated that FOC 
will occur in approximately FY 2017. 
To realize the CNO’s vision of the “1,000 ship Navy”, global FOC, to include 
Coalition partners and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the FORCEnet Level 3 
capabilities will have to be further realized by all potential participants.  This level of 
capability is highly desirable to achieve global interoperability.  As the development and 
fielding of this capability is beyond the scope of U.S. Navy efforts, an accurate timeframe 
for true global FOC cannot be adequately predicted. 
 
Figure 3-9 Levels of FORCEnet 
J. ASSETS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE INITIAL OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY (IOC) 
In order to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the FORCEnet 
integrated battleforce, each platform must be equipped with FORCEnet enabling systems 
to allow for preliminary sharing of data across the participants.  In addition, at least one 
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U.S. platform and one Coalition platform must be able to act as a Super-Node for 
exchanging information with the GIG.  Table 3-8 provides a list of assets required for the 
three selected scenarios. 
Table 3-8 Assets Required for IOC 
Scenario Objective Blue Force Fn Level 
ASW ESG/CSG aims 
to localize the 
Red force 
submarines 
1 MPA, 1 SSN, LFAS and 
deployable barrier sensors 









3 LCS, 1 SSN, 2 DDG, 2 
Coalition FFG/DDG, 
MPA/AWACS/UAV/helos, 









3 LCS, 2 DDG, 2 Coalition 
FFG/DDG, 1 U.S. E-2C, 1 





In addition to the assets listed above, UAVs and satellites are also required for 
beyond line-of-sight communications. 
K. DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, MATERIEL, LEADERSHIP 
AND EDUCATION, PERSONNEL, AND FACILITIES (DOTMLPF) 
The following paragraphs define the expected changes in the Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel and Facilities areas 
required to support the FORCEnet architecture outlined in this CDD.  It was determined 
early during the requirements definition process that non-materiel changes in and by 
themselves would not be sufficient in addressing the full spectrum of user requirements.  
Consequently, this section focuses on the changes required within DOTMLPF to fully 
exploit the multi-tiered architecture described within this CDD.   
 Table 3-9 below provides a matrix mapping of the Measure Of Effectiveness 
(MOE) attributes to the DOTMLPF components.  As expected, the architecture described 
will require transformation in several of the DOTMLPF areas to fully realize the 
FORCEnet potential.  
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Table 3-9 MOE to DOTMLPF Mapping 
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Quality of Information X X X X
Collaborative Working X X X X X X X
Shared Awareness X X X X X
Self Synchronizing X X X X X X
Distributed Combat Elements X X X X X X  
 
Modeling and simulation of DOTMLPF is another area that requires further 
investigation during the acquisition cycle.  Figure 3-10111 below presents a DOTMLPF 
spiral construct that could be used during Trident Warrior exercises to explore 
DOTMLPF considerations side-by-side with the materiel architecture to provide a 
holistic assessment of the entire system.  
 
Figure 3-10 DOTMLPF Development Spiral 
The following sections address specific points and concepts in the Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities areas and build 
upon the quote112 “The ability to achieve a heightened state of shared situational 
awareness and knowledge among all elements of a Joint force … is increasingly viewed 
as a cornerstone of transformation…Realization of the full potential of Network-Centric 
Warfare requires not only technological improvements, but the continued evolution of 
organizations and doctrine and the development of relevant training that will enable 
U.S., Allied, and Coalition forces to develop and sustain an asymmetric advantage in the 
information domain.” 
 
                                                 
111 Harrison, D. (2003).  Modeling and Simulation Technology – Studies and Analysis. 
112 2001 Network-Centric Warfare Report to Congress 
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1. Doctrine  
Significant doctrine changes will be required to exploit the architecture defined in 
this document.  The goal is to create the operational concept that allows the integrated 
force to support Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG), Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), 
Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) and Coalition force missions in the Joint and/or 
Combined environment.  The second focus is to examine the training/readiness 
continuum as the Navy transforms its training philosophy to meet the challenges and 
opportunity presented by the operational concept. 
Doctrine will need to evolve in order for Coalition forces to be synchronized in 
terms of command structure, warfare areas, mission assignments and commanders’ 
authority.  For example, Shared Awareness, Self Synchronizing and Collaborative 
Working depend as much on doctrine transformation as they do on materiel changes for 
the Joint Force to transition from a primarily autonomous force to a Distributed Combat 
Element.  A Coalition force without a flexible doctrine that allows cross domain, real-
time collaboration and shared awareness, will continue to be disjointed and unable to 
achieve full spectrum dominance in the Under Sea Warfare (USW) area.  
a. Security 
Security policy must support the establishment of a single standing global 
network which allows timely access by a wide variety of potential coalition partners and 
non-governmental organizations.  
In the past, many operational and experimental exercises have 
demonstrated shortcomings in Department of Defense (DoD) arrangements for 
multinational information sharing with allied and coalition partners.  The key component 
in enhancing our ability as a Joint Force is to strengthen collaboration with our 
multinational partners113, which would require improvement in our ability to collect, 
process, and share information. 
Currently, there are six multi-national enclaves as part of U.S. coalition 
network: 
                                                 
113 2004 National Military Strategy 
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• Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 
(CENTRIXS) Four Eyes (CFE): Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
and United States (AUSCANUKUS). 
• Global Counter Terrorism Task Force (GCTF):  Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
• Combined Naval Forces Central Command (CNFC) 
• Multinational Coalitional Forces Iraq (MCFI):  Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) 
• CENTRIXS J:  U.S. and Japan 
• CENTRIXS K:  U.S. and Korea 
Several countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, New 
Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and Japan have adequate communication 
systems onboard their ships.  However, countries such as Pakistan, India, Korea, 
Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei still need support via the Flyaway Kits114.  
Lessons learned from past joint exercises indicate that INMARSAT terminals will also 
need to be included in the Flyaway Kit in order to achieve an interoperability session. 
There are several policy issues, administrative requirements, and process 
mechanisms negatively affecting the successful and timely exchange of information: 
• Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of 
Agreement (CISMOA).  This process typically takes from one to two 
years to execute, and requires negotiation between the Combatant 
Commander (COCOM) and the other host nations. 
• Data Sharing Agreements.  Current data sharing agreements are based 
on specific alliances and operations and approved by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD).  This information requires continued 
updating and the existing process takes extended time for approval. 
                                                 
114 Flyaway Kits – Combination of KG-175 (TacLANE) and Cisco Router.  The TacLANE will 
provide Type-1 data encryption and the router would be configured with specific routing protocol and 
configuration. 
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• Cross Domain versus in Domain.  Current applications and 
configurations do not support real time collaboration.  The cross 
domain configuration is limited by accreditation rules and it is not 
viable for individual access. 
• Too many specific networks.  Currently, there are six network 
configurations. It is both time consuming and costly to establish a 
specific standalone enclave for every individual contingency. 
• Lack of integration and interoperability.  Current applications and 
information between US-developed and allied-developed do not have 
the ability to integrate.  The U.S. and coalition networks do not have 
an efficient way to establish interoperable capabilities. 
Due to various issues, critical time and data could be lost due to 
unclear/undefined guidance on releasable classified and unclassified information among 
member nations.  Nevertheless, inefficient and inadequate information management 
between U.S. and coalition nations would need to be addressed. 
The Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) and Coalition Information 
Sharing (CIS) programs have provided guidance for improving the efficiency of 
information exchange between allied and coalition members.   It is important to provide 
restricted access to U.S. classified networks for allied and coalition exchange officers and 
embedded staffs, and appropriate Government Agencies as well as private non-
governmental organizations, while at the same time, accepting non-U.S.-generated 
classified data and protecting it in accordance with standards and regulations of the 
originating party.  Since the United States cannot provide interoperability certification for 
allied/coalition networks or systems, the alternative solution is to provide an 
Interoperability Assessment of their networks and systems.  This method will improve 
coherency across security domains through common, consolidated data repositories, 
ensure access to data by cleared users, and maintain data fidelity across domains without 
over-sanitization.  It is necessary to establish streamlined process-oriented system support 
organization and capability for allied and coalition networks while ensuring the system is 
complies with: 
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• Applicable Information Technology (IT) Standards contained in the 
most current version of the DOD Information Technology Standards 
and Profile Registry (DISR)  
• Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) GIG Certification 
requirements. 
• Radio frequency spectrum supportability requirements per DoDD 
4650.1115, as applicable. 
• STANAG 5523, the NATO Corporate Data Model. 
• Flexibility to ensure prompt modification, addition and deletion of 
allied and coalition member nation access and permissions, and 
appropriate Government Agencies. 
• Efforts should be made to cultivate international standards for crypto 
products focusing on the NSA developed releasable High Assurance 
Internet Protocol Interoperability Specification (HAIPIS). 
• Operational rules and testing regimen to govern development of 
analog and digital Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), 
required by Commanders and staffs to effectively use the information 
exchanged. 
Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and 
interagency operations.   Interoperability is a mandate for the Joint Force of 2020 – 
especially in terms of communications, common logistics items, and information sharing.  
Information systems and equipment that enable a common relevant operational picture 
must work from shared networks that can be accessed by any appropriately cleared 
participant.  There must be a suitable focus on procedural and organizational elements, 
and decision makers at all levels must understand each other’s capabilities and 
constraints.  Training and education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and 
skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force must not only overcome the barriers of 
                                                 
115 DoDD 4650.1 – Department of Defense Directive 4650.1 released on June 8, 2004.  The subject of 
this directive was the policy for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. 
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organizational culture and differing priorities, but must teach members of the joint team 
to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.  The future joint 
force will have the embedded technologies and adaptive organizational structures that 
will allow trained and experienced people to develop compatible processes and 
procedures, engage in collaborative planning, and adapt as necessary to specific crisis 
situations.  These features are not only vital to the joint force, but to multinational and 
interagency operations as well.  
b. Releasability 
The timely release and sharing of information across security domains is a 
prerequisite for successful implementation of network-centric warfare across the 
coalition. Coalition architectures address several of the above steps during the acquisition 
phase.  However, there remains a need for rapid approval and on-site flexibility to adjust 
the overall configuration for changes in force composition.  Cross-domain multi-national 
authentication and authorization devices need to be developed that allow coalition 
partners to quickly join tactical and non-tactical networks.    
The subparagraphs below present an abridged outline of the current 
releasability directives and clearly illustrate the challenges in achieving timely shared 
awareness throughout a coalition force.  These policies must be updated to ensure 
adequate flexibility and timliness in responding to emergent coalition operations. 
Documentation to be provided to foreign national must be approved 
through the appropriate approval channels prior to release.  For example, the 
COMSPAWARSYSCOM Security Programs Office is the approving authority for all 
release or disclosure decisions to any foreign national.  The Public Affairs Office (PAO) 
is the appropriate office for information in the public domain. 
• Typical international agreements include the Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and Data 
Exchange Agreement (DEA).  Persons contemplating an initiative with 
a foreign government or international organization that requires an 
international agreement must seek guidance from the appropriate 
General Counsel or Staff Judge Advocate. 
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The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), (USD(P)), has the responsibility 
within DoD for authorizing the negotiation and conclusion (signing) of all categories of 
international agreements. The USD(P), in DoD Directive 5530.3, has delegated some of 
this authority to other officials within the Department of Defense. 
DoD Directive 5530.3 authorizes various DoD Component officials to 
approve negotiations and the conclusion of certain categories of international agreements. 
This authority does not relieve the officials from the coordination requirements of the 
Directive.  Moreover, the USD(P) reserves approval authority for all proposed 
agreements.  These agreements involve, among other things, international cooperation in 
RDT&E or production of defense articles, services or technology and which specifically 
involve either:   
• Disclosure of classified information. 
• Technology-sharing or work-sharing arrangements. 
• Co-production of military equipment. 
• Offset commitments. 
DoD Directive 5530.3 also requires the coordination of security provisions 
for agreements likely to involve the release of CMI, classified technology or classified 
material with the Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for Policy Support 
(DTUSD(P)PS), before making any commitment to a foreign government or international 
organization. This is to ensure that security provisions are consistent with national and 
DoD disclosure policies, and that they are consistent with pertinent international security 
agreements.  DoD Directive 5230.11 prohibits the disclosure of classified information or 
commitments to do so pending a disclosure decision by an appropriate disclosure 
authority. (See DoD Directive 5530.3 for required coordination for matters other than the 
disclosure of CMI.) 
2. Organization  
Organizational changes will be a necessity to transform our current nation-centric 
coalition force into an integrated force capable of distributed warfare. The 
transformational architecture outlined in this document requires a bottom-up review of all 
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coalition platforms to appropriately allocate billet positions in a manner that allows 
seamless transition across the coalition force.   
In order to fully exploit the FORCEnet architecture across the coalition force, the 
organization needs to evolve from a liaison based methodology to one with “smart” 
command and control protocols that are readily adaptable to each collation platform and 
organization.  Achieving a truly net-centric organization requires an integrated Command 
and Control (C2) organization where designated leaders are authorized to assign battle 
force sensor and weapon resources regardless of national origin.   
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Command Relationships Chart (OV-4)
Coalition Platforms not FORCEnet Capable
 




Command Relationships Chart (OV-4)
Coalition Platforms are FORCEnet Capable (Option 4)
 
Figure 3-12 OV-4 FORCEnet Capable 
3. Training  
A multi-tiered training transformation needs to take place along the lines of Sea 
Warrior, but integrated with Trident Warrior and other Coalition exercises to achieve a 
cross platform common frame of reference in architecture implementation and execution.  
Training scenarios need to be refined to account for the FORCEnet transformation.  
Understanding the cost of assembling a Coalition force at the frequency necessary to 
keep warfighters proficient would be cost prohibitive.  A synthetic architecture needs to 
be exported to Coalition partners that will allow robust, high fidelity training scenarios to 
be conducted across the GIG.  The synthetic architecture currently in use for U.S. Carrier 
and Expeditionary Strike Group training should be exported to Coalition partners to allow 
them to fully participate in planned events.  Expansion of shore based training centers 
and/or Distributed Engineering Plants would provide all Coalition partners another 
training option for prospective gains and during periods of platform inaccessibility.  Of 
equal importance, is a shore based infrastructure to support/augment maintainers as the 
complexity of C4ISR systems exponentially increases.   
 
 104
4. Materiel  - Human System Integration 
The majority of systems in use today are inadequate in supporting the architecture 
described in this document.  Many systems were stop-gap initiatives to quickly fill an 
emergent need and do not lend themselves well in supporting the warfighter requirements 
outlined in this document.  It is not the intent of this architecture to discard the valuable 
lessons learned from systems like Composeable FORCEnet, but to build on them in an 
integrated, sustainable manner.  Adaptive networks capable of intelligent, autonomous 
reconfiguration will be necessary to provide sustainable systems that account for 
Coalition composition in real time.   
HSI/HFE will be depended on heavily to provide systems capable of manipulating 
several data sources while provide a coherent picture that prevents operator sensory 
saturation.  It is assumed that the implementation of this architecture will not only 
provide a robust system, but one that is sustainable with an availability (Ao) approaching 
100 percent.  It is also acknowledged that retreating to a legacy system will not be 
possible without a significant reduction in warfighting capability.  Consequently, the 
logistics support architecture will need to fully support the integration efforts of U.S. and 
Coalition forces and the goals of the Tactical Integration plan. 
The importance of Human Systems Integration cannot be overstated as 
highlighted in the following quotes:  
• “The stakes are high…. We must never lose sight of the challenge 
of a future enemy … an enemy who uses asymmetric means. [But the Navy 
has] two asymmetric advantages – incredible technology and incredible 
people…. [Industry must help the Navy improve HIS to] win the battle for 
finance and be competitive economically in acquisition.”116  
• “In the final analysis, the performance of our nation’s Sailors 
makes the difference between victory and defeat… HSI must be established 
as a budget line item in all programs, not buried in the murky word 
‘logistics.’ Sailors are not logistics elements.”117  
                                                 
116 Clark, V. (2003).  2003 Human Systems Integration Symposium 
117 Balisle, P. M. (2003).  2003 Human Systems Integration Symposium 
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The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized human performance as the 
primary determinant of overall system performance in the FORCEnet transformational 
core.  As discussed in one HSI summary report,118 “Unprecedented emphasis on fully 
integrating the human as a critical element of a cost effective, complex total system from 
the earliest phases of system design has resulted”.  The HSI requirement while essential, 
also poses a significant challenge since functions and relationships between FORCEnet’s 
human, process, organizational and technological components are not well understood.  
Likewise, linkages between concept, policy and architecture that affect the human 
element’s performance are not well understood.  
The rapid increase is the amount of battlespace information will require 
systems capable of rapidly collating a myriad of sources and projecting a coherent 
picture.  Recognizing HSI as an interdisciplinary means to draw from an existing and 
rapidly evolving body of knowledge that emphasizes human performance as a 
fundamental dimension of systems performance119 is central to the described 
architecture’s implementation.  In heuristic terms generally accepted by the C4I 
community: Proper HSI yields improved human performance, which in turns yields 
improved system performance.  
Figure 3-13120 provides an excellent construct for viewing FORCEnet as a 
total system comprising a complex mix of human, process, organizational and 
technological components.  Failure to properly integrate HSI into the overall architecture 
will likely produce a bloated system incapable of providing the warfighter with the right 
information, in the right format at the right time to effect the right course of action.  
                                                 
118 Poirier, J. (2003).  Summary Report: FORCEnet Human Systems Integration (HSI) Outreach and 
Coordination Initiative.  Deliverable D007 under Contract T0002AJM032 by Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) 
119Booher, H. R. (2003).  Human Systems Integration Handbook.  Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
120 Poirier, J. (2003).  Summary Report: FORCEnet Human Systems Integration (HSI) Outreach and 
Coordination Initiative.  Deliverable D007 under Contract T0002AJM032 by Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) 
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Figure 3-13 Top-Down/Bottom-Up Construct 
5. Leadership and Education  
Leadership and Education will need to address the training 
development/continuum of future joint and Coalition command personnel in order for 
those personnel to accurately assess the battlespace spectrum and provide the necessary 
direction based on that assessment.  Speed of command will require a two-fold reduction 
in cycle time to counter future threats in the 2015 time frame.  Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) that evolve during Trident Warrior and Coalition exercises will need 
to be quickly evaluated and rolled into the architecture as well as doctrine and 
organization.  As discussed above, training for this architecture is a continuum that must 
integrate all system of systems components into an exportable and releasable Coalition 
module for real-time, integrated training across the Coalition force.  The training 
scenarios must be high fidelity and current so joint and collation commanders can hone 
their skills in a battlespace much different from today’s – a battlespace that will place a 
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premium on decision speed.  The architecture is predicated on all Coalition forces having 
similar access to training scenarios, both in single platform and Coalition configurations.   
6. Personnel  
The architecture fully supports the Navy’s future personnel profile and will 
support manpower projections of future ship classes (CVN-21, LCS, DDX).  Data mining 
concepts explored in this architecture will allow a large repository of information to be 
managed and configured remotely with a push/pull interface.  Data mining also reduces 
analysis and fusion cycle times as well as personnel requirements to complete these tasks.  
Added engineering rigor in the development of replication algorithms will allow all 
platforms to achieve greater efficiency across the manpower spectrum by allowing 
support functions to be automated with administrative functions completed remotely.  
The architecture robustness will also allow for high fidelity training, both tactical and 
technical to be completely across the globe regardless of threat posture.       
Through appropriate Human Systems Integration and Human Factors Engineering 
efforts, this architecture will require fewer personnel per operational cell and those 
personnel will be able to assimilate mixtures of data quickly in producing a coherent 
shared awareness picture.      
7. Facilities  
Existing DoD facilities will require upgrading in concert with the architecture 
outlined in this document.  Equally important, will be a combined doctrine and 
organization assessment to ensure the theater and support components are synchronized 
and aligned with the architecture.  The proposed architecture requires in-theater control 
and administration to allow collaboration and shared awareness across the spectrum.  The 
architecture also demands an agile facilities infrastructure to rapidly create and/or modify 
theater networks for asymmetric warfare.  
L. FORCENET (FN) MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. Approach 
Modeling the selected vignettes of the scenario required the development of 
simulations that represented capabilities of the FORCEnet architecture for the Blue (US 
and Coalition) force.  The battle force operation consists of three layers grid:  Sensor 
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grid, command and control (C2) grid, and Engagement grid.   For platform-centric 
architectures, these grids are stove piped and platform independent.  The information 
from a platform is not necessarily available to the other platforms in the battle force.   For 
the FORCEnet architecture, the grids must be integrated and networked for the entire 
battle force in order to achieve the information superiority-enabled concept. This 
integrated networking concept is shown in Figure 3-14. 
 
T h e  S e n s o r  to  S h o o te r  G r id s
C 2  G r id
S e n so r  G rid
E n g ag em e n t  G rid
 
Figure 3-14 FORCEnet Integrated Networking Concept 
This figure shows that at the sensor grid, the sensor data from one platform is 
available to any platform in the network/battle force.  This enables platform(s) to perform 
parallel search using the sensor resources available in the battle force.  At the C2 grid, the 
netted sensor data allows platform(s) to perform data fusion to obtain a more accurate 
picture of the object/target being track.  At the Engagement grid, the network-centric 
concept allows platform(s) to have the Integrated Fire Control.  Various concepts for IFC 
are shown in Figure 3-15121. 
                                                 
121 Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare, by B. W. Young, August 2004 
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Figure 3-15 Integrated Fire Control Variants 
The ability to perform data fusion and integrated fire control are not available in 
platform-centric architectures.  These capabilities were modeled to compare the 
performance between platform-centric and network-centric warfare. 
In addition to modeling the above mentioned capabilities, some of the theoretical 
analysis approaches are also used to estimate the probability of detection for different 
sensors.  For example, a Random search model is used to provide a conservative estimate 
for the probability of detection (Pd) for sensors, which is used as an input into the model.  
For a more granular search such as submarine search, an Inverse Cube model is used.  


















 Pd = probability of detection 
 Φ = standardized, normal probability density function with mean 0 and 
variance of 1  
 W = sweep width 
 S = spacing between platforms searching in parallel 
 Z = 1.253* W/S 
The following assumptions are made for the modeling effort: 
• Reasonably faithful to reality for 2015 timeframe. 
• Capability Gaps are the focus of the EXTEND model: Parallel Search, Data 
Fusion Resource manager, Integrated Fire Control. 
• Goal is not to solve the scenario – it is to show FN capability gaps and benefits. 
• FN uncertainties: not every missile leaves the launcher, not every missile will be 
detected, unpredictable weather, etc. 
• Discrete event model with three vignettes running simulations in sequence. 





/( ) 1 1CDP: t vWt ATF t e  e




CDP cumulative ection probability
v speed
W sweep width







1[ ] AE T
vW
= =λ
2 1.253 1Φd WP S
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 111
2. Measures of Performance (MOP) 
 
Table 3-10 provides the MOPS that are used to evaluate the results: 
 
Table 3-10 Measure of Performance (MOPs) 
Grid Measure of Performance (MOP) 
Sensor (Detection) # (targets) detected 
# (targets) not detected 
Command and Control
(C2) 
total # identified (enemy ship) 
# identified (non-hostile) 
# subs identified 
# subs not (detected on slide) identified 
# missiles identified 
# missiles leakers 
# tracked via precision cue (all threats) 
Engagement total # missiles engaged via IFC 
# engaged (platform-centric) 
# enemy killed 
total # of leakers 




The model is implemented as a discrete event model using the Extend simulation 
program.  (The Extend modeling and simulation program is more fully covered in 
Appendix C.)  The simulation represented the scenario and provides the information 
output of a Sensor grid, C2 grid, and an Engagement Grid.  The goal is to send the output 
of the simulation into a Geographical Information System (GIS) to provide the decision 
maker the common operational picture (COP).  Figure 3-16 summarizes the high-level 
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diagram of the modeling approach.  The simulation was developed in ten iterations and is 
described in Appendix C.  
 
Figure 3-16 High-Level Diagram of the Modeling Approach 
a. Sensor Grid Model 
The probability of detection increases when sensors are in parallel. All 
discrete event models in Extend must have an Executive block and it must be placed in 
the top left hand corner for the model to work. For the input to the sensor grid a “program 
block” was used, which allows multiple inputs onto the model. The output of the program 
blocks provides the enemy ships, missiles, submarines, and non-hostile ships for the 
sensor grid to detect. The model also integrated the three mission threads ASW, ASuW, 
and AMSD into one model. 
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Figure 3-17 Integrated Model 
To simulate sensors in parallel using Extend, a “Select DE output” block 
was used to represent the Force Composition platforms (ships, aircraft, etc). The “Select 
DE output” selects the input item to be output at one of two output connectors based on a 
decision. This detection decision was based on the estimated probability of detection 
using the random search model. Sensors were placed in parallel.  Figure 3-18 shows the 
platforms in parallel. A “combine 5” block combines the detected targets and outputs to 
the C2 grid. 
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Figure 3-18 Parallel sensor model 
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c. C2 Grid Model 
The output of the sensor grid feeds into a Data Fusion Resource Manager 
(DFRM). The DFRM is considered a capability gap because there is no technology 
currently available that can “fuse” information. It requires all network-centric platforms 
to share and fuse information together to accurately provide the common operational 
picture, common tactical picture, and fire control picture. To develop this model, 
attributes were assigned to the targets being detected. The attributes are assigned in the 
program block and are seen as red circles. When running the model, the red circles are 
detected in the sensor grid and then they input into the C2 grid. In the C2 grid the 
detected targets are fused together with intelligence information and attribute data to 
clearly identify the target. At this point in the model, the red circle would be identified 
and “appear” as a ship, submarine, missile, or non-hostile ship. The identified targets are 
sorted, counted, and then “precision cued” to assign ships to track and if necessary 
engage the enemy through integrated fire control. The output of the DRFM inputs to the 
engagement grid.  
To develop the C2 grid, refer to Figure 3-19, the targets from the Sensor 
grid are routed to an “animate attribute” block. This block will read the attribute 
information of the incoming target and fuse the intelligence data to identify the target. 
Here the detected target would be identified and the animation would change from a 
circle to a ship, sub, or missile. The identified targets are routed through a count block 
and then into a FIFO queue for processing. The output of the FIFO queue flows into a 
“get attribute” block. This block reads the fused information and sorts the targets based 
on attribute data. This allows the Select DE 5 block to only send ships through the top 
path, non-hostile ships through the second path, missiles through the third path, and subs 
through the fourth path. This sorting processing allows the tracking of the number of each 
type of incoming target and also allows the simulation to “precision cue” the targets to 
the best platform to track. Next, a “combine 5” block and a FIFO are used to route targets 
to the precision cue stage. A random block is used to assign a uniform distribution to cue 
platforms to track detected and identified targets (Figure 3-20). Through the DFRM all 
platforms in the FN will see the same picture. 
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d. Data Fusion Using Attribute Information 
select












































Figure 3-19 Data Fusion Model 
 

































































Figure 3-20 Cueing model 
e. Engagement Grid 
The output of the C2 grid inputs into the Engagement grid. This portion of 
the model represented the integrated fire control concepts of “launch on remote, engage 
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on remote, remote fire, and forward pass.” The scenario required the Coalition to engage 
a missile attack. There were several possibilities: all the detected missiles were engaged, 
some missiles that were not detected, some missiles that were engaged but were missed 
or there was a failure. The few missiles that got through hit blue ships and some missed 
blue ships. Refer to Figure 3-21. 
It was important to use the correct distribution throughout the model to be 
as realistic as possible. For the input all detected targets were being tracked through 
precision cueing. The resource manager determined the best shooter. To simulate 
selection of the “best shooter” use an activity service block with a lognormal distribution 
and a Select DE 5 block with a Poisson distribution to estimate arrival rate. The output of 




























Figure 3-21 Integrated Fire Control model 
The input is a FIFO block. Below in Figure 3-22 is an example of how to 
model “launch on remote.” The remote unit is an activity delay block with a normal 
distribution. In this case the remote unit is an LCS ship which tracks the incoming 
missiles, and provides the tracking data to the DDG ship. The DDG will then engage the 
incoming missiles using the LCS track data. An activity delay block was used for the 
DDG with an exponential distribution to represent the engagement fire. The number of 
missiles being killed was estimated using the binomial distribution at the end in a Select 
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IV. RESULTS 
A.  SENSOR GRID RESULTS 
Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 summarize the simulation results for the sensor grid, the 
C2 grid, and the Engagement grid, respectively.  These results were obtained after 10,000 
runs from the model with a 95% confidence interval. 
Table 4-1 Sensor Grid Results 
Detection Grid   
 # detected # not detected Rank 
Option 1 128.38 0.78 2 
Option 2 90.66 + 32.7= 123.36 0.32 + 5.58 = 5.9 4 
Option 3 127.14 1.86 3 
Option 4 129.1 0.44 1 
 C2 Grid   
 total # identified (enemy) # identified (non-hostile) # subs identified 
Option 1 6.96 27.88 1.88 
Option 2 4.74 19.62 1.87 
Option 3 6.9 27.76 1.92 
Option 4 6.98 27.91 1.95 
 C2 Grid   
  # subs not detected # missiles identified # missile leakers 
Option 1 0.12 91.38 8.82 
Option 2 0.13 82.3 6.4 + 3.22 = 9.62
Option 3 0.08 90.48 8.56 
Option 4 0.05 91.4 6.9 
 
 
Table 4-2 Grid Results 
 all threats C2 grid 
  # tracked via precision cue Final Rank 
Option 1 128.1 3 
Option 2 90.53 4 
Option 3 127.06 2 







Table 4-3 Engagement Grid Results 
 Engagement Grid   
 total # missiles engaged    
 via IFC # engaged (platform-centric) # enemy killed 
Option 1 83.18 0 73.72 
Option 2 58.12 20.08 51.26 + 16.78 = 68.04
Option 3 83.44 0 77.26 
Option 4 88.1 0 85.3 
 Total (if only 1 engagement) Engagement Grid 
 # of leakers # blue hits suffered  Final Rank 
Option 1 18.28 5 3 
Option 2 21.2 6 4 
Option 3 14.6 4 2 
Option 4 6.1 2 1 
 
 
Based on the above results, Option 4 provides the highest Fn capabilities and also 
had the best results. Option 2 had the worst results.  This is due to the non-Fn capability 
of the Coalition forces.  The results show that Fn provides the following improvements: 
• Sensors – 5% improvement in number of threats detected. 
• C2 – 42% improvement in tracking via precision cue. 
• Engagement – 25% improvement in threat neutralization. 
 
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION SUMMARY 
The results show that Fn provides improvement in all three areas of operation:  
Sensor grid, C2 grid, and Engagement grid.  Network-Centric war-fighting is value added 
to Coalition Forces. Non-FORCEnet forces sustain higher casualties. Option 4 had the 
highest FN capabilities and also had the best results. Option 2 had good results but 
finished last. 
Modeling conceptual FORCEnet architecture capabilities through simulation was 
accomplished successfully after integrating the three mission threads into one model. 
This allowed attribute data to be fused to clearly identify incoming targets. Additionally, 
the model was developed as a mini prototype of how a sensor grid could provide 
information to a GIS to assist in decision making.  
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The output of the simulation provided information for a common operational 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This effort has identified desired capabilities to improve U.S. and Coalition 
warfighting effectiveness in a network-centric environment.  It has: 
• Explained the advantages provided by FORCEnet as described in existing 
literature and policy documents 
• Identified Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I) capabilities required to achieve improved Situational Awareness (SA) and 
warfighting effectiveness 
• Determined that materiel solutions must be accompanied by a common Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) and agreement in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs).  Essential among these are: 
o Timely and Effective Releasability Policy 
o Unity of Command and Control (C2) 
o Adequate Peace-Time Training 
• Demonstrated, through Modeling and Simulation (M&S), that implementation of 
the recommended materiel and non-materiel capabilities will result in a 
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APPENDIX A: ARCHITECTURAL ARTIFACTS 
A.1 Architectural Frameworks 
Architectural frameworks provide a standard format for describing architectures.  
The framework used for this project is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
Version 1.0.  Section 1.1 of the DoDAF describes the purpose of the Framework in the 
following manner: 
 “. . . to provide guidance for describing architectures for both warfighting 
operations and business operations and processes.  The Framework provides the 
guidance, rules, and product descriptions for developing and presenting 
architecture descriptions that ensure a common denominator for understanding, 
comparing, and integrating Families of Systems (FOS), Systems of Systems 
(SoS), and interoperating and interacting architectures.”122 
Part of this project was to understand the System of Systems that will potentially 
be part of FORCEnet and to compare and quantify warfighting effectiveness based on 
forces that are either partially or completely FORCEnet capable.  The DoDAF is an 
excellent tool for presenting the architectures and supporting this comparison. 
A.1.1 Architectural Views 
Within the DoDAF, architectures are described from a number of perspectives or 
views.  The DoDAF contains three major views: operational, system and technical, and 
also contains views that relate to all perspectives called all views.   
According to Mark W. Maier and Eberhardt Rechtin in their book The Art of 
Systems Architecting, the operational view “. . . shows how military operations are 
carried out through the exchange of information.  It is defined as a description of tasks 
and activities, operational elements, and information flows integrated to accomplish 
military operations”.123  System views are described by Maier and Rechtin as “a 
description, including graphics, of a system and interconnections providing for, and 
                                                 
122 DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.0, Volume I: Definitions and Guidelines (Department of 
Defense, [2004]), 1-1. 
123 Mark W. Maier and Eberhardt Rechtin, The Art of Systems Architecting (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 
2002), 224. 
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supporting, warfighting functions”.124  A technical view, according to Maier and Rechtin, 
is “. . . defined as a minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and 
interdependence, of systems, parts, or elements, whose purpose is to ensure that a 
conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements”.125 
A.1.2 Views Used for this Project 
A list of the specific views that were used for this project include: 
• OV-1 – High Level Operational Concept Graphic 
• OV-2 – Operational Node Connectivity Description 
• OV-4 – Organizational Relationships Chart 
• OV-5 – Operational Activity Model 
• OV-6c – Operational Event-Trace Description 
• SV-1 - Systems Interface Description 
• AV-1 – Overview and Summary Information 
• AV-2 – Integrated Dictionary 
These views were created for this project as they would best convey the nature of 
the FORCEnet system of systems to the stakeholders, to support the comparison of 
warfighting effectiveness for various force compositions and levels of FORCEnet, and to 
provide the necessary presentation materials for the project briefings. 
A.2 Operational Views 
A.2.1 High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) 
According to Volume II of the DoDAF, the purpose of the OV-1 diagram is to 
provide a quick, high-level description of what the architecture is supposed to do and 
how it is supposed to do it.  The DoDAF further indicates that the graphic is useful in 
facilitating communication and is generally presented to high-level decision makers.  
When other views are required for a system, these views will flow from the OV-1 
through an analysis of the operational nodes, identification of information exchange 
requirements and mapping of systems functions to physical systems. 
                                                 
124 Mark W. Maier and Eberhardt Rechtin, The Art of Systems Architecting (Boca Raton: CRC Press 
2002), 225. 
125 Ibid., 226. 
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A.2.1.1 Coalition FORCEnet OV-1 
The OV-1 diagram for this project, shown in Figure A-1, shows the high-level 
operational concept graphic describing the Future FORCEnet system.  The central entity 
of this system is the future communications network.  It depicts United States (US) and 
Coalition forces functioning together using FORCEnet (Fn) to defeat air, surface, 
subsurface, and land threats.  Linking the U.S. and Allied nodes makes the total force 
much larger and more integrated. 
 
1



























Figure A - 1 OV-1 
A.2.2 Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) 
According to Volume II of the DoDAF, the purpose of the OV-2 diagram is to 
graphically depict operational nodes or organizations with needlines between them that 
indicate a requirement to exchange information between them.  An operational node is an 
element that produces, consumes, or processes information. 
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The needlines only indicate a need to exchange information.  The manner in 
which the information exchange occurs is not provided by this diagram. 
A.2.2.1 Coalition FORCEnet OV-2 
Two OV-2 diagrams were created for this project and are shown in Figures A-2 
and A-3.  One diagram shows the information exchange between nodes when the 
Coalition platforms are not Fn capable (Figure A-2).  This corresponds to Fn level 0 as 
defined in the following table: 




0 No FORCEnet.  Vessels use voice radio and Link 11 or 16 to share situational awareness and C2 data.  Platform-centric in character. 
1 
Filtered, delayed, low bandwidth (dialup) FORCEnet (like ‘no 
FORCEnet’, but higher fidelity/faster updates).  ESG/CSG has access to reach 
back and has the ability to distribute intelligence information gained from that 
to all ESG/CSG members.  Information from organic sensor and intelligence 
data is available with some time delay throughout ESG/CSG.  Recognized 
maritime picture (RMP) which fuses organic and other ESG/CSG data is 
distributed with minor time delays. 
2 
Real-time targeting information gained from any U.S. or Coalition 
asset/source (when latter is technically capable) is available to all ESG/CSG 
vessels as required.  Access to targeting information is assured within 
understood limitations. Information accuracy, timeliness and coverage 
continuity are assured up to predefined levels.   
Rapidly updated RMP is available to all ESG/CSG vessels. 
3 Weapons systems are networked but are only able to be controlled by national authority. 
4 
Vessels of all Coalition nations are technically and 
politically/militarily able to offer weapons systems as a network service for 
command by approved authorities from any of the nations within the 
ESG/CSG. 
 
The second OV-2 diagram (Figure A-3) shows the information exchange when 
the Coalition platforms are Fn capable.  The diagram is the same for FORCEnet levels 1 
– 4 since the OV-2 diagrams merely show information exchange between nodes without 
regard for the timeliness of the data or the type of data.  For example, two platforms 
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exchanging organic sensor and intelligence data with some time delay is depicted in an 
OV-2 in the same way as two platforms exchanging real-time targeting data. 
Common to both OV-2 diagrams (Figure A - 2 and Figure A - 3), are some 
number Fn capable platforms connected on a theater network, primary and secondary 
GIG interface units, and representative organizations that supply and consume 
information to or from the theater platforms.  One of the Fn capable platforms in the 
theater is designated as the “Super-Node” and another is designated as the “Auxiliary 
Super-Node”.  The Super-Node is a designation given to the senior capital ship of the 
battlegroup (BG) and is also assigned the role of exchanging information between the 
theater network and nodes on the GIG.  In this role, the Super-Node is responsible for 
both publishing information to the GIG and subscribing to information from nodes of 
interest on the GIG.  Additional details of the GIG information exchange is provided by 
the OV-5 diagrams, shown later in this appendix.  The Auxiliary Super-Node is the 
designation of any additional capital ships that are capable of assuming Super-Node 
responsibilities.  The Auxiliary Super-Node automatically assumes the role of the 
primary in the event of a Super-Node failure. 
The theater network provides the means to exchange information between Fn 
capable platforms in the theater.  As such, when Coalition platforms are not Fn capable, 
as is shown in Figure A - 2, the Coalition platforms are not connected to the theater 
network.  Instead, the Coalition platforms exchange information via systems like Link-11 
or Link-16.  One of the units on the theater network acts as a data forwarder between the 
Coalition platforms on the tactical data link and the theater network.  In this 
configuration, the Coalition platforms are limited by the data that is supported by the 
tactical data link.  A Coalition platform using Link-11 could not receive imagery data 
since Link-11 does not support imagery.  Figure A - 3 shows Coalition platforms that are 
Fn capable and are connected to the theater network.   
Two types of platforms are present on the theater network – U.S. 
primary/Coalition platforms (shown in blue) and Other US/Coalition platforms (shown in 
green).  The blue platforms are larger, more capable platforms that participate directly on 
the theater network.  Examples of these more capable platforms are CGs, DDGs and 
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larger platforms.  The green platforms are smaller, less capable platforms, such as a 
maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and unmanned vehicles, which do not directly 
participate on the theater network.  Instead, these platforms have a point-to-point 





































Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2)






















































Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2)















Figure A - 3 OV-2 FORCEnet Capable 
A.2.3 Command Relationships Chart (OV-4) 
According to the DoDAF, the OV-4 “illustrates the command structure or 
relationships (as opposed to relationships with respect to a business process flow) among 
human roles, organizations, or organization types that are the key players in an 
architecture.”126  Examples of relationships provided in the DoDAF are supervisory 
reporting, command and control, command-subordinate, and coordination between 
equals. 
A.2.3.1 Coalition FORCEnet OV-4 
Two OV-4 diagrams were created for this project.  One diagram (Figure A - 4) 
shows how Coalition command structure is set up when it does not have a completed 
FORCEnet capability (FORCEnet Level 0, 1 and 2).  The other diagram (Figure A - 5) 
shows the commands relationships that are fully Fn Capable (FORCEnet Level 4).  The 
diagram is the same for FORCEnet levels 1 – 4 since the OV-4 diagrams do not show the 
type of information exchange between nodes. 
                                                 
126 DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.0, Volume II: Product Descriptions (Department of 
Defense, [2004]), 4-27. 
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Common to both OV-4 diagrams (Figures A - 4 and A - 5), is that U.S. JFCOM 
(Joint Force Command) would provide the overall command and control information and 
decision to all U.S. component commands such as Joint Force Special Component 
Command, Joint Force Land Component Command, Joint Force Maritime Component 
Command and Joint Force Air Component Command and collaborate (shown as blue 
lines) with allied commands which will provide information and direction to their 
subordinate commands on information sharing.  When the Coalition forces are not Fn 
capable (Figure A - 4), the information flow would only be from the Joint Force 
Command (JFCOM) that is established by Coalition forces.  In such case, all forces (US 
and allied) may experience uncommon operational pictures and delaying Command and 
Control (C2) information update.  This time delay would make collaboration extremely 
difficult.  However, when forces are Fn capable (Figure A - 5), it would enable all 
participants in the network to have common operational and tactical information.  Hence, 
collaboration process between U.S. and allied countries would become better and more 
efficient. 
 




Figure A - 5 OV-4 FORCEnet Capable 
A.2.4 Operational Activity Model (OV-5) 
The DoDAF contains the following description of the OV-5: 
“The Operational Activity Model describes the operations that are 
normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission or business goal.  It 
describes capabilities, operational activities (or tasks), input and output (I/O) 
flows between activities, and I/O flows to/from activities that are outside the 
scope of the architecture.”127 
The OV-5 may contain hierarchy charts that describe the various activities that 
occur in achieving a mission and may also contain process flows that describe the 
sequence and timing of these activities. 
                                                 
127 DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.0, Volume II: Product Descriptions (Department of 
Defense, [2004]), 4-31. 
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A.2.4.1 Coalition FORCEnet OV-5 
The analysis and modeling for this project is limited to three of the eight vignettes 
described in the statement of work due to the limited amount of time available to work on 
the project.  The three vignettes are Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) against the Kilo 
submarines, Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) against the hostile surface action group and 
Anti-Surface Missile Defense (ASMD) against the missiles fired by the enemy surface 
platforms. 
Common to all of these vignettes is the establishment of the recognized maritime 
picture (RMP).  Since establishing and maintaining the RMP covers detection and 
tracking of air, surface, and subsurface objects, the majority of the tasks for the three 
vignettes are covered by the task of establishing the recognized maritime picture.  The 
ASMD vignette also requires the platforms to conduct surface missile defense.  Thus, 
establishing the RMP and conducting ASMD are the two main tasks that are the primary 
focus of the OV-5 diagrams as shown in Table A - 2.  These two main tasks are further 
decomposed in Figures A - 6 through A - 15.  Descriptions of selected tasks in the 
hierarchy are provided in the table below. 
Table A - 2 OV-5 Task Descriptions 
Task Number Task Name 
Task Description 
1.1 Establish Recognized Maritime Picture 
This task includes all of the activities that support generation of the plot and 
associated textual information that depicts the maritime activities in a given area.  This 
includes air, surface, subsurface and some land objects such as surface-to-air missile 
sites. 
1.1.1 Conduct Surveillance Operations 
This task employs the sensor assets of the strike group to detect air, surface and 
subsurface objects. 
1.1.2 Distribute/Process Sensor Data 
Using the theater network shown in OV-2, sensor data is distributed and 
processed by each of the FORCEnet capable platforms.  The Statement of Work (SOW) 
indicates that real-time targeting information gained from any U.S. or Coalition 
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asset/source (when latter is technically capable) is available to all ESG/CSG vessels as 
required. 
1.1.3 Interface with the Global Information Grid (GIG) 
As shown in the OV-2 diagrams, two theater platforms are designated as the 
primary and secondary GIG interface units.  The primary GIG interface unit is 
responsible for retrieving relevant information in response to the needs of theater 
platforms and is also responsible for providing theater data to interested nodes on the 
GIG.  The secondary GIG interface unit monitors the activities of the primary unit and 
assumes the primary role in the event of a primary unit failure.  
1.1.3.1 Obtain GIG Information 
In this task, the primary GIG interface unit retrieves information for itself or on 
behalf of other theater platforms.  The process of retrieving includes discovery and 
retrieving or pulling data from the provider.  According to the DoD Net-Centric Data 
Strategy, “All data is advertised and available for users and applications when and where 
they need it.  In this environment, users and applications, search for and ‘pull’ data as 
needed.  Alternatively, users receive alerts when data to which they have subscribed to is 
updated or changed (i.e., publish-subscribe).”128 
1.1.3.1.1 Process Intelligence Information 
For this task, relevant intelligence data is retrieved from the Intelligence 
community of interest.  Communities of interest are described by the DoD Net-Centric 
Data Strategy as “collaborative groups of users who must exchange information in 
pursuit of their shared goals, interests, missions, or business processes and who therefore 
must have shared vocabulary for the information they exchange.  Communities provide 
an organization and maintenance construct for data such that data goals are realized.  
Moving these responsibilities to a COI level reduces the collaboration effort as compared 
to managing every data element Department-wide.”129 
1.1.3.1.2 Process Battlespace Awareness Information 
For this task, relevant information is retrieved from the Battlespace Awareness 
Community of Interest.  Battlespace Awareness is one of the COIs in the Warfighter 
Domain of the GIG. 
1.1.3.1.3 Process Meteorology/Oceanography Information 
The primary GIG interface unit retrieves meteorology and oceanography 
information from the GIG.  One organization that supplies this data is the Fleet 
Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC).  This node is present in 
the OV-2 diagram.  FNMOC’s mission is to prepare the marine and joint battlespace to 
                                                 
128DoD Chief Information Officer, DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy (Department of Defense, 2003), 3. 
129 Ibid, 4. 
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enable successful combat operations from the sea, to exploit the meteorological and 
oceanographic opportunities and to mitigate the challenges for Naval operations, plans, 
and strategy at all levels of warfare. 
1.1.3.1.4 Process Geospatial/Intelligence Information 
The primary GIG interface unit retrieves geospatial intelligence information from 
the GIG.  One organization that supplies this data is the National Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency.  This node is present in the OV-2 diagram.  According to the NGA website, 
“The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides timely, relevant, and 
accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives. Geospatial 
intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to 
describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced 
activities on the Earth.  Information collected and processed by NGA is tailored for 
customer-specific solutions. By giving customers ready access to geospatial intelligence, 
NGA provides support to civilian and military leaders and contributes to the state of 
readiness of U.S. military forces. NGA also contributes to humanitarian efforts such as 
tracking floods and fires, and in peacekeeping.  NGA is a member of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community and a Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support 
Agency.”130 
1.1.3.2 Publish Data to GIG 
In this task, the primary GIG interface unit in the theater publishes metadata to 
support discovery by other GIG nodes.  Should another node be interested in the data, the 
interested node (subscriber) requests the data.  Once the request is validated, the data is 
pushed (published) to the subscriber.  Platforms that are capable of serving as the GIG 
interface unit must support translation to the formats used on the GIG.  For example, the 
Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document for the GIG indicates that “United States 
Imagery and Geo-spatial Information Service (USIGS) standards should be used for the 
processing and display of imagery and geospatial data across the GIG.”131  The GIG 
interface unit must be capable of translating between this and other formats. 
1.1.4 Provide Data Fusion Services 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
1.1.4.1 Data Assessment 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
                                                 




131 Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document(MAICD) 
Global Information Grid (GIG), (Joint Forces Command, 2002),13. 
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1.1.4.2 Object Assessment 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
1.1.4.3 Situation Assessment 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
1.1.4.4 Impact Assessment 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
1.1.4.5 Process Refinement 
A description of this task is provided in section 2.2.5.3. 
1.1.5 Interface with Disadvantaged Platform 
When Coalition Forces are operating at FORCEnet Level 0, U.S. Forces exchange 
command and control data using tactical data links.  The statement of work indicates that 
either Link-11 or Link-16 is used.  Link-22 may also be one of the tactical data links used 
and was also included in this project.  One of the U.S. platforms in the theater acts as a 
data forwarder between the tactical data links and the Fn theater network.  The Super-
Node may also publish metadata to the GIG to indicate tactical link data is available to 
GIG users and will provide the data to interested GIG participants. 
1.2 Defend Against Surface Missile Threats 
One of the vignettes associated with this project is to conduct anti-surface missile 
defense.  This task consists of conducting air surveillance and distributing the 
surveillance data, determining the preferred shooter and engaging the target. 
1.2.1 Determine Preferred Shooter 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
1.2.1.1 Evaluate Engagement Options 
In the process of determining the preferred shooter, a number of engagement 
options may be available.  This task evaluates a number of these options to select the 
optimum engagement method.   
1.2.1.1.1 Evaluate Precision Cue 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
1.2.1.1.2 Evaluate Launch on Remote 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
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1.2.1.1.3 Evaluate Engage on Remote 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
1.2.1.1.4 Evaluate Forward Pass 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
1.2.1.1.5 Evaluate Remote Fire 
This task is described in section 2.2.2.2. 
1.2.2 Engage Target 
In this task, the target is engaged by one or more platforms using the selected 
engagement method. 
 
Process flows talked about in the OV-4 table, that show the sequence of events for 












Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
 











































Operational Activity Model 1.1.1 (OV-5)
 












Operational Activity Model 1.1.3 (OV-5)
 






















Operational Activity Model 1.1.3.1 (OV-5)
 





















Operational Activity Model 1.1.3.2 (OV-5)
 




















Operational Activity Model 1.1.4 (OV-5)
 


























Operational Activity Model 1.1.5 (OV-5)
Transmit Link






















































Figure A - 15 OV-5 Level 1.2.1 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Establish Recognized Maritime Picture
















Figure A - 16 OV-5 Date Flow RMP1 
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Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Establish Recognized Maritime Picture
















Figure A - 17 OV-5 Data Flow RMP2 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Establish Recognized Maritime Picture

















Figure A - 18 OV-5 Data Flow RMP3 
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Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Provide Data to Other GIG Participant
Theater Platform GIG Participant
Publish Metadata
1.1.3.2.1 Search Catalog of Metadata
GIG Participant Discovers Metadata
Process Request for Data
1.1.3.2.2 GIG Participant Requests Data
Validate Data Request
1.1.3.2.3
Push Data to Requesting Participant
1.1.3.2.4 GIG Participant Processes Data
 
Figure A - 19 OV-5 Data Flow GIG1 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Obtain Data from Other GIG Participant
Theater Platform GIG Participant
Determine What Information is Required
Post Metadata to Allow Discovery




Push Data to Requesting Participant
1.1.3.2.4Process GIG Data
Conduct Search of Metadata
(If Data Source Not Known)
Request Data 
 
Figure A - 20 OV-5 Data Flow GIG2 
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Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Interface with Disadvantaged Platform


















Figure A - 21 OV-5 Data Flow DP1 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Interface with Disadvantaged Platform















Figure A - 22 OV-5 Data Flow DP2 
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A.2.4 Operational Event/Trace Description (OV-6c) 
As defined in the DoDAF, the Operational Event-Trace Description (OV-6c) 
“provides a time-ordered examination of the information exchanges between 
participating nodes as a result of a particular scenario.”132  The purpose of this 
architectural artifact is in its value as an iterative step, providing the next level of detail 
from the initial operational concepts (OV-1, OV-2, etc…).  It helps to define the node 
interactions and operational threads (the set of operational activities) with sequencing and 
timing attributes of the activities. 
A.2.4.1 Coalition FORCEnet OV-6c 
For this project, the OV-6c diagrams, shown in Figures A - 23 and A - 24 were 
developed for the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) against Kilo submarines and the Anti-
Surface Warfare (ASuW) against the Red Surface Action Group (SAG) vignettes. 
In this Event-Trace, information is exchanged in an effort to establish a shared 
Common Operational Picture (COP/RMP) across the battlegroup (BG), and any 
subscribing user on the GIG. 
The make-up of the BG is consistent with the Order of Battle provided in the 
project Statement of Work (V0.g).  The Super-Node is a designation given to the senior 
capital ship of the BG.  Auxiliary Super-Node is the designation of any additional capital 
ships that are capable of assuming Super-Node responsibilities.  Every action undertaken 
by the Super-Node is simultaneously conducted by all Auxiliary Super-Nodes.  The 
Super-Node and Auxiliary Super-Nodes continuously synchronize all databases.  All 
other nodes are networked within the BG (fully FORCEnet capable) and are 
independently addressable.  An exception is the UAV, which is considered a 
disadvantaged user, and it reports to the DDX, which in turn is responsible for UAV 
reporting and dissemination of data.  In essence, the UAV is an extension of the DDX. 
This event-trace is initiated when the BG Super-Node issues a request for an 
intelligence report from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) regarding the Red SAG 
force in the Sulu Archipelago.  Simultaneously, the Super-Node informs all Auxiliary 
                                                 
132 DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.0, Volume II: Product Descriptions (Department of 
Defense, [2004]), 4-55. 
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Super-Nodes of the initial request.  Upon receipt of the ONI intelligence report, the 
Super-Node disseminates the report to all members of the BG. 
Following the initial intelligence distribution within the BG, the Super-Node 
requests and receives sensor status from all platforms within the BG.  Processing the 
sensor status information, the Super-Node then assigns sectors and tasks the various 
sensors.  Data Fusion and synchronization is performed aboard each Super-Node with 
every report. 
After the request for sensor status and reporting, the Super-Node prioritizes the 
threats and then initiates another request of the BG, this time requesting weapons status 
(inventory and availability).  Upon receipt of this information, the Super-Node assigns 
weapons to each threat.  Since the Red SAG is not currently considered a threat to the 
BG, a weapons hold order is issued to all weapons.  This concludes the description of this 
event-trace. 
Figure A - 24 is similar to Figure A - 23 below, but the Operational Event-Trace 
depicts the information exchange for the Anti-Subsurface Warfare against the Red Kilo 
threat. 
Apart from the mission, the primary difference of the ASW event-trace from 
Figure A - 24 below is the increase in disadvantaged platforms.  In this case, the DDX is 
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A.3 System Views 
A.3.1 System Interface Description (SV-1) 
The DoDAF indicates that the SV-1 “depicts systems nodes and the systems 
resident at these nodes to support organizations/human roles represented by operational 
nodes of the Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2).  SV-1 also identifies the 
interfaces between systems and systems nodes.”133   
A.3.1.1   Coalition FORCEnet SV-1 
This view allows an architect or developer to allocate functionality into the 
FORCEnet system solution and to establish interoperability interface points for the 
foundational elements of FORCEnet.  This System View (SV) will be used as a technical 
reference model that will define constraints on system implementations.  The FORCEnet 
family of common services will ensure compatible systems and business rules (doctrine) 
for the Warfighter; they will ensure technical interoperability and configuration 
management for the engineers; and they will ensure that Joint solutions can be shared 
across service, agency and civilian boundaries to reduce acquisition investment 
requirements.  The System Interface Description identifies the interfaces between system 
nodes, between systems, and between the components of a system.  In order to provide 
access to for all Navy users, anywhere in the world, infrastructure nodes must be 
implemented in numerous locations.  For Pier connections in the Continental United 
States (CONUS), infrastructure nodes will exist at two (or more) Network Operation 
Centers (NOCs).  This format was used to provide an understanding of the most critical 
service from a warfighter perspective, leading and managing the operation. 
The FORCEnet goal is to enable all platforms in theater to connect to the GIG 
network through different means, either via the fiber connection over land or the radio 
communication over the water.  For connections between commands on land, the WAN 
network can be established using fiber connection such as OC3/12 to provide the 
bandwidth ranging from 1.544 Mbps and up to 45 Mbps.  This would enable real time 
database synchronization and information sharing with minimal time delay is necessary 
to request and receive the sensor, C2, and situational awareness data.                                                    
133 DoD Architectural Framework Version 1.0, Volume II: Product Descriptions (Department of 
Defense, [2004]), 5-1. 
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For primary platforms at sea such as CV(N), LHD, and LPD, the Beyond Line-of-
Site (BLOS) radio communication systems are suggested to be the primary 
communication method for reaching to the shore site (i.e. teleport), then through the 
landline, connect to the GIG network.  For other U.S. platforms at sea, the HF, UHF, 
VHF and SATCOM can provide inter and intra shipboard communication that can utilize 
the primary platform to act as the gateway to the GIG network.  At the same time, with 
certain SATCOM capabilities for BLOS connection to the teleport at shore, through the 
landline, to the GIG network.  The HF, UHF, and VHF Line-of-Sight (LOS) radio system 
can provide the audio and data support with the data range from 4.8 Kbps to 64 Kbps. 
The theater network provides the means to exchange information between Fn 
capable platforms in the theater.  As such, when Coalition platforms are not Fn capable, 
as shown in Figure A - 25, the Coalition platforms are only connected to the network via 
CENTRIXS network provided by U.S. platforms.  Instead, the Coalition exchanged 
information via legacy Tactical Data Link (TDL).  The primary communication systems 
between Coalition platforms is suggested to be HF, UHF and VHF system with some 
SATCOM capabilities onboard certain ships. 
The network structure onboard U.S. platforms may change once the Coalition 
platforms are Fn capable.  The CENTRIXS network that currently resides in the 
Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) network may also change due to enabling 
Fn capability with the Coalition partners. 
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Systems Interface Description (SV-1) 
Coalition Platforms Not FORCEnet Capable
 
Figure A - 25 SV-1 Non-FORCEnet Capable 
Systems Interface Description (SV-1) 
Coalition Platforms are FORCEnet Capable
 
Figure A - 26 SV-1 FORCEnet Capable 
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A.4 All Views 
A.4.1 Overview and Summary Information (AV-1) 
 The AV-1 is similar to an executive summary.  This view is a high-level 
textual description of the architecture in a common format. 
A.4.1.1 Coalition FORCEnet AV-1 
Table A - 3 AV-1 
Architecture Product Identification 
Architecture Product Name Coalition FORCEnet – San Diego Capstone Project 
Architect Naval Postgraduate School MSSE Students – San 
Diego 
Organization Developing the 
Architecture 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Assumptions and Constraints Assumptions 
• Architecture will address ASW, 
ASUW, ASMD 
• All communications networks are 
assumed to have sufficient bandwidth 
• Communications networks are assumed 
to have minimal latency 
• Doctrine, policy, tactics, techniques and 
procedures will be in place to support the 
suggested architecture. 
• Cross domain security technology 
exists to support releasability and information 
assurance 
• Sensor and weapon systems identified 
in this study are limited to existing and systems 
currently in development 
Constraints 
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• Project to be completed by 5 September 
2006. 
Approval Authority Naval Postgraduate School 
Date Completed 5 September 2006 
Scope  
Views and Products Developed AV-1, AV-2, OV-1, OV-2, OV-4, OV-5, OV-6c, SV-1 
Time Frames Addressed 2015 
Organizations Involved Naval Postgraduate School, SPAWAR Systems 
Command, SPAWAR System Center, Navy Center for 
Tactical Systems Interoperability, Fleet ASW Training 
Center, Defense Information Systems Agency 
Purpose and Viewpoint 
Purpose To demonstrate knowledge of systems engineering 
while providing guidance to Coalition Nations 
(AUSCANNZUK) by identifying opportunities to 
participate in FORCEnet, and to quantify the 
operational benefits of participation.   
Analysis • Determine what benefit, if any, is provided by 
Coalition participation in FORCEnet. 
• Identify the requirements for Coalition 
FORCEnet participation. 
• Determine the architecture of the US/Coalition 
force. 
• Evaluate the architecture against the Philippine 
Comfort Scenario. 
Questions • What are the expected benefits for Coalition 
Nations that participate in FORCEnet? 
• Will FORCEnet provide significant increases 
in capability over existing systems? 
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• What is required to participate in FORCEnet? 
Viewpoint from which 
Architecture is Developed 
The architecture is being developed from an academic 
viewpoint as part of the MSSE Program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Context 
Mission Conduct joint operations in support of Operation 
Philippine Comfort 
Rules, Criteria, and 
Conventions Followed 
• Architectural Views consistent with DoD 
Architecture Framework Version 1.0 
• Final paper written in the Capabilities 
Development Document format 
Tools and File Formats Used 
Tools  Extend Modeling Software Version 6.0, Microsoft 
Office XP, ArcGIS 9.X 
Findings 
Analysis Results  The results of the simulation analysis are provided in 
Sections 11.4 and 11.5. 
Recommendations Recommendations for further study are provided in 
section 11.6. 
 
A.4.2 Integrated Dictionary (AV-2) 
The AV-2 is the glossary of the architecture.  This view provides textual 
definitions of terms used in describing the architecture. 
A.4.2.1 Coalition FORCEnet AV-2 
ASMD – Anti-Surface Missile Defense 
ASUW – Anti-Surface Warfare 
ASW – Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Auxiliary Super-Node – The Auxiliary Super-Node is the designation of any 
capital ship that is capable of assuming Super-Node responsibilities.  The Auxiliary 
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Super-Node automatically assumes the role of the primary in the event of a Super-Node 
failure. 
COI – Community of Interest.  This is an element of the GIG that is listed in OV-
5 
COP – Common Operational Picture 
CTP – Common Tactical Picture 
Coalition National Authority – These organizations provide authorization for 
weapons release on Coalition platforms in FORCEnet levels 3 and below. 
Combatant Command – This node is present in OV-2.  This node provides 
command, control and intelligence information and is responsible for conducting mission 
operations. 
Embassies – This node is present in OV-2.  Embassies provide National-level 
intelligence and other information. 
FCP – Fire control picture 
FNMOC – Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center.  This node is 
present in OV-2.  FNMOC’s mission is to prepare the marine and joint battlespace to 
enable successful combat operations from the sea, to exploit the meteorological and 
oceanographic opportunities and to mitigate the challenges for Naval operations, plans, 
and strategy at all levels of warfare. 
GIG – Global Information Grid.  This is one of the nodes in OV-2.  Nodes 
interface with the GIG using a GIG Enterprises Services Interface. 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) – The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial 
intelligence in support of national security objectives. Geospatial intelligence is the 
exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and 
visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.  
Information collected and processed by NGA is tailored for customer-specific solutions. 
By giving customers ready access to geospatial intelligence, NGA provides support to 
civilian and military leaders and contributes to the state of readiness of U.S. military 
forces.  NGA also contributes to humanitarian efforts such as tracking floods and fires, 
 157
and in peacekeeping.  NGA is a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and a 
Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agency.134   This node is present in OV-
2. 
Office of Naval Intelligence – This office supports joint operational commanders 
by providing comprehensive national level intelligence. 
Other Platform – This is one of the nodes used on OV-2.  These are smaller 
platforms such as the Maritime Patrol Aircraft and TAGOS ships.  In general, these 
platforms communicate with Primary Platforms and do not directly connect to the theater 
network. 
Pacific Command – The U.S. Pacific Command, in concert with other U.S. 
government agencies and regional military partners, promotes security and peaceful 
development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, advancing regional 
security cooperation, responding to crises, and fighting to win.  This node is present in 
OV-2 
Primary Platform – This is one of the nodes used in OV-2.  These are larger 
more capable platforms such as CG, DDG, LCS, and SSN.  In general, primary platforms 
are capable of direct connections with both the theater network and the GIG. 
Super-Node – The Super-Node is a designation given to the senior capital ship of 
the battlegroup and is also assigned the role of exchanging information between the 
theater network and nodes on the GIG.  In this role, the Super-Node is responsible for 
both publishing information to the GIG and subscribing to information from nodes of 
interest on the GIG. 
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APPENDIX B: GIS METHODS 
B.1 Geospatial Information System 
The output of the simulation represented a common operational picture (COP).  
To do this using an ArcGIS system required a map of the Philippines, the islands and seas 
to the west of the main island. The information that will be provided to produce the COP 
is X Y (lat/long) of enemy and Coalition forces.  Several layers of information were used 
for specific lat/long positions. The lat/long positions were the outputs from a simulation 
program (EXTEND) into excel, then saved as DBF files and added to the GIS program. 
B.1.1 Map Creation 
The following are the specific steps that were accomplished for the development 
of the map for this project. 
1. Start a new map in Arcmap. 
2. Select Add Data, select World Folder from MSGIS, and select Countries. 
3. In the contents right click Layers > select Properties > select Coordinate System > 
Predefined > Projected coordinate system > Continental > Asia > Asia south 
equidistant conic > select Ok 
4. Back in the map – zoom into the Sulu Sea west of Philippine Islands. To find the 
Philippines > right click on Countries > Properties > Label > check the box to 
“label features in this layer.” 
5. Bookmark the Sulu Sea and the Philippines using view > Bookmark > Create. 
6. Next add several layers from Final Project > data folder in MSGIS: Select Add 
Data > select spratleys.shp.  
7. Select Add Data > select country_claims.shp 
8. Select Add Data > select natcapitols.shp. 
9. To add x y data to the map: The x y data (lat/long) is the information output (to 
Excel) from the simulation software Extend – it is detection of target information, 
which will be displayed in the GIS to provide the common operational picture.  
Next, change the Excel output to dbf files. 
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10. Open the Excel file FN_parameters.xls > click on the blue_ships tab > save as 
dbf.  Do the same process to convert to dbf for the following tabs: Coalition ships, 
Blue HVA, Blue A/C, Blue sub, Red subs, Red ships > all “save as” dbf to the 
data folder. 
11. Now add x y data to the map. Go to Tools> Add X Y Data > select blue ships > x 
field = lat, y field = long. This should now appear as a layer in the map. 
12. Do the same process to add x y data for Coalition ships, Blue HVA, Blue A/C, 
Blue sub, Red subs, Red ships. These should be new layers in the map. 
13. It is useful to group blue and red forces separate.  Click on blue ships, then while 
holding down the Ctrl key select Coalition ships, Blue HVA, Blue A/C, Blue sub. 
Now right click blue ships and choose Group.  Change the group layer name to 
Blue Forces.  Repeat this process to create a group (Red forces) for the Red subs 
and Red ships. 
14. To show a "detection zone" around our Coalition forces click the Tools menu and 
click Customize. 
15. Click the Commands tab > click Tools > click on Buffer Wizard and drag it to 
any toolbar. Click Close. 
16. Next, select Buffer Wizard for each blue layer with a distance of 50 kilometers. 
17. Select properties for each buffer layer and set transparency to 60%. 
18. Use the Select Tool. Click on Philippines > right click Countries > export data to 
products folder > add as a layer. This will add the Philippines as its own layer.  
Do the same for Indonesia and Malaysia. 
19. Use text boxes to identify the volcanic eruption, rebel positions, and enemy SAG 
position. 
20. Next, identify the Exclusive Economic Zone 200 NM around Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia.  Select Buffer Wizard > Philippines > 200 nautical 
miles.  Repeat this for the three countries. 
At this point there should be a map that contains enemy ship locations, EEZ 
200NM buffer, country claims, and a sensor grid example of the Coalition forces.  It 
should look similar to Figure B – 1 below. 
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Figure B - 1 Scenario map 
B.1.2 Map Projection 
Select the Asia south equidistant conic which is a projected coordinate system 
with a datum of Spheroid_WGS_1984.  Selection of this projection was based on the area 
of the world that the project is focused.  Equidistant projections maintain constant scale 
along all great circles (shortest distance between any two points) from one or two points.  
It is not possible to preserve distances (scale) correctly throughout a map projection.  
Additionally, no flat map can be both equidistant and equal-area. 
B.1.2.1 Advantages 
This is an excellent projection to use because of the mapping of a region within a 
few degrees of latitude with entire area on one side of the equator.  This projection is 
commonly used on small countries or areas, oriented on east-west in the mid-latitudes. 
Equidistant Scale: True only along the chosen standard parallels and along all meridians.  
Standard parallels are those free of distortion. 
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B.1.2.2 Disadvantages 
Equidistant Distortion is free of distortion along either of the two standard 
parallels, but increases further away.  Distortion is a compromise between equal-area and 
conformal.  This projection is a compromise between the Albers Equal-Area and Lambert 
Conformal Conic, and as such is neither conformal, equal-area, nor perspective.  
 
 
Figure B - 2 ArcGIS Data Frame 
 
B.1.3 Data 
Figure B - 3 shows the naming and data management of the data used in ArcGIS 
for this project.  Figure B - 4 shows the Table of Contents inside the ArcGIS program and 
shows the multiple layers used for the development of the project map. 
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Figure B - 3 ArcCatalog 
 
Figure B - 4 ArcMap Layers 
Data was obtained as an output from the Extend FORCEnet simulation program, 
two shape files (Spratly and country claims), and from the mgisdata folder. 
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B.1.3.1 Layers 
The following is a description of each layer in the ArcGIS table of contents, 
starting from the top down: 
1. The first layer is a group called “Red forces” and it contains two layers called 
RedSubs and Redships.  The data was obtained from Excel.  It was the lat/long 
information output from the EXTEND simulation program.  The excel file was 
saved as a dbf file and added as an x y layer showing enemy and Coalition 
locations.  During each simulation run the x y data is updated in the Excel file 
resulting in new enemy locations appearing in the GIS program.  A diamond 
shape was used as a symbol for a submarine and a ship symbol for the Redships.  
An example of Lat/Long output from EXTEND to excel is shown in Table B - 1.  
To add the above information use tools > add x y data. Follow this process for 
each enemy and Coalition platforms (ships, subs, aircraft). 
Table B - 1 Redship Lat/Long Data 
No Unit LAT LONG Red ships 
1 10 121.330 9.600 P_corvette 
2 20 120.200 8.200 P_corvette 
3 30 119.000 9.000 VS FFG 
4 40 120.000 9.000 VS FFG 
5 50 119.400 8.800 VS FFG 
 
2. With the EXTEND simulation providing the lat/long information to Excel, the 
process in step one was repeated for the second group layer “Blue Forces” which 
consists of Coalition ships, BlueSub, BlueHVA, and BlueAircraft.  For each of 
these layers different shapes were used.  Blue forces (US ship) were colored blue, 
Red forces color red, and Coalition ships were colored green. 
3. The next group was called “FN sensor grid.” This layer was created to show the 
area of coverage that a “netted” group of ships would provide.  The buffer wizard 
was used to place a coverage area around each Blue ship, Coalition ship, Blue 
HVA, and BlueAircraft. The buffer was set to 30% transparent for each so that the 
blue forces could be seen.  
4. The fourth group is named “Three countries.”  Select the countries using the 
select tool, and then export the data and added the three countries back as layers.  
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These layers were used for the 200NM EEZ around Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Philippines.  
5. The fifth group is called “Map elements.” This is really the foundation of the GIS 
map. Add the following shape files: Spratly Islands, country claims, countries 
(world map), and also a sub group called “200NM EEZ”.  With this group, a 
200NM EEZ zone was set around Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
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APPENDIX C: EXTEND 
C.1 Extend Explained 
Blocks are the basic model-building components in the Extend modeling and 
simulation software.  Each block represents some part of the process being modeled, such 
as a chemical reaction or a machine’s activity.  A block’s icon shows its meaning in the 
model and double-clicking the icon reveals a dialog for entering the block’s data.  Blocks 
contain unique procedural information and are grouped into libraries according to 
function. (Extend User Manual). 
Creating an Extend model is done by dragging blocks from a library onto a 
worksheet, connecting them, and then entering the appropriate data in the dialog.  
Simulation involves building a dynamic model of a process or system, then 
performing what-if analysis to see how changes would affect the actual process.  By 
mimicking its operation one can understand the system better and explore alternative 
strategies.  This model mimicked the operation of a resource manager and integrated fire 
control. 
C.2 Extend iterative modeling approach 
A discrete event model of FORCEnet was developed in ten steps.  In discrete 
event models, discrete entities change state as events occur in the simulation.  Targets 
arriving, ships being “cued” and engagement of targets are examples of discrete events.  
The state of the model changes only when those events occur; the mere passing of time 
has no direct effect.  A factory that assembles parts is a good example of a discrete event 
system.  The individual entities (parts) are assembled based on events (receipt or 
anticipation of orders).  The time between events in a discrete event model is seldom 
uniform.  
C.3 Extend simulation development 
The following is a step by step process on developing the simulation model, for 
this project, using the Extend program. 
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Step 1: The first Extend simulation model contained three models: Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), and Anti-Surface Missile 
Defense (ASMD).   Platforms were placed in parallel as a sensor grid, but incoming 
targets could not clearly be identified.  The probability of detection was estimated using 
the random search model.  There was cueing but not “precision cueing.”  This was a 
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Figure C - 1 Three Vignette Models 
 
Step 2: In the second development of the model, the sensor resource manager was 
improved, but it was difficult to clearly identifying targets.  Additionally, there were still 
three separate models: ASW, ASuW and ASMD (Figure C - 2). 
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SE iterative approach: Second model focused on Sensor resource manager (precision cue), 
addition of known and unknown targets,
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Figure C - 2 Initial Resource Manager 
 
Step 3: The Integrated Fire Control capability (Figure C - 3) was then developed 
in the engagement grid.  The modeling of “launch on remote,” “engage on remote” and 
“remote fire” was simulated through a binomial distribution (for probability of kill).  If a 
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SE iterative approach: Third model focused on Integrated fire control: Launch on 




Figure C - 3 Integrated Fire Control 
Step 4: By having three models and an engagement grid the model grows quickly 
(Figure C - 4).  The only way to simplify this model was to integrate the three models 
into one resulting in a single integrated model.  Below in Figure C - 5 the integration was 
accomplished but there was still a problem of integrating the ASW model.  By using 
intelligence attribute information, the resource manager was improved allowing the 
simulation to clearly identify the incoming threats.  The ASW mission was integrated into 
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SE iterative approach: Fourth model focused on Integrated fire control and 2nd
engagement of defense – model grows exponentially with each new requirement 
(note: were still only in option 1)
How to improve?
Integrate the 3 models!
 
Figure C - 4 Large Model Prior to Integration 
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SE iterative approach: Fifth model focused on Data fusion, identification of all 
threats, and integration of ASUW and missile attack 
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Figure C - 5 Integrated Model 
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SE iterative approach: Sixth model focused on integration of ASW model into data 
fusion resource manager 
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Figure C - 6 Improved Data Fusion Model 
 
Step 6: In the eighth model, Option 2 was completed and is shown in Figure C - 7.  
This option in the given scenario added two Coalition ships that had no FN capability – 
they were modeled as platform-centric. 
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SE iterative approach: Eighth model focused developing Option 2 
Coalition ships: NON 
Fn: Platform centric
 
Figure C - 7 Non-FORCEnet Capable Ships Added 
 
The final step of the Extend model development: The Coalition ships were 
integrated into model.  This allowed the completion of the Extend model for options 3 
and 4.  Essentially they were the same models but with slightly different FORCEnet 
capability.  The output of the Extend model provides the information output to GIS for 
display of the common operational picture.  The 10th model improved the data fusion at 
the resource manager (Figure C - 8). 
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SE Iterative approach: 9th Model added Coalition ships to FN grid and finished developing 
models for options 3 and 4
Coalition ships added 
to FN detection and 
engagement grids
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